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THESIS

THE POTENTIAL OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA NAVY FOR
COOPERATION WITH THE
JAPANESE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
IN THE SECURITY OF
GREATER EAST ASIA

by

Jack R. Carpenter, Jr.

June 1985

Thesis Advisor:

Edward A. Olsen

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Finally, the realities of possible cooperation are assessed, and some recommendations advanced for encouraging and enhancing that cooperation.

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The Potential of the Republic of Korea Navy for Cooperation
with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force in the
Security of Greater East Asia

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1974

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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June 1985

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I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the Navy of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to determine if the two navies can cooperate to enhance the security of East Asia. This subject is particularly germane for several reasons. First, the threat of Soviet interference in Japan's affairs, and to a lesser extent, South Korea's, is increasing. The Soviets attempted to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States by deploying SS-20 medium-range missiles in Siberia, in retaliation for Japan's plans to deploy 48 F-16 fighter-bombers at Misawa.¹ The Soviets also increased troop strength on the southern Kurile Islands,² continued to develop their base at Cam Rahn Bay,³ and shot down an unarmed Korean Airlines Flight 007,⁴ demonstrating that they are serious about maintaining their vital security prerogatives. Some Japanese view these Soviet moves with concern. Others caution against over-reacting, which could jeopardize the future of Soviet-Japanese trade.⁵ Could ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation blunt this Soviet military threat?

¹Geoffrey Murray, "Tokyo Worries Soviet SS-20's May Swing East," Christian Science Monitor, 21 January 1983, p. 1.

²Geoffrey Murray, "Tokyo Finds Political Leverage With Moscow Essential to Settle Issues," Christian Science Monitor, 22 April 1983, p. 7.

³Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1985, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 118.

⁴Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1984. (Tokyo: Japan-Times, 1984), p. 111.

⁵Geoffrey Murray, "Japan Businessmen Eager to Restore Soviet Ties," Christian Science Monitor, 8 February 1983, p. 5.

Second, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is an unpredictable political and military force on the Korean peninsula. As demonstrated by the Rangoon bombing incident which killed 17 South Korean government officials,⁶ sporadic border incursions into South Korean territory,⁷ and the ubiquitous attempts by North Korea at seaborne infiltration into the South,⁸ the DPRK is willing to take significant risks to achieve Korean reunification on its own terms. The DPRK President, Kim Il Sung,⁹ has repeatedly vowed to reunify the Korean peninsula during his lifetime.¹⁰ Kim is now 72 years old and with the leadership passing to his son, Kim Chong Il, will President Kim launch another war to gain his stated objective? Could ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation help stabilize this situation?

Third, an ever-growing U.S. trade imbalance favoring Japan (by \$37 billion)¹¹ and Korea (by 3 billion)¹² is of rising concern to U.S. lawmakers who spent over \$52 billion¹³ of a total \$273.4 billion 1984 defense budget to maintain security in the Far East.¹⁴ (See Appendix A for a summary of U.S. forces in that region.) Compared with

⁶"The New Asian Era," Wall Street Journal, 11 October 1983, p. 30.

⁷"What's News," Wall Street Journal, 20 June 1983, p. 1.

⁸"What's News," Wall Street Journal, 5 December 1983, p. 1.

⁹Throughout this thesis, Korean family names will be printed first; Japanese family names will be printed last.

¹⁰Norman Thorpe, "Activities in North Korea Give Jitters to South Korean, American Analysts," Wall Street Journal, 2 April 1982, p. 26.

¹¹Charles P. Alexander, "Buy More Foreign Goods," Time Magazine, 22 April 1985, p. 42.

¹²Henry Eason, "Trading Views: Korea and the United States," Nation's Business, December 1984, pp. 50-51.

¹³The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1984-1985, (London: Heffers Printing, 1984), pp. 4-10.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 4-11.

Japan's defense contribution of \$11.6 billion¹⁵ and the Republic of Korea's \$4.32 billion,¹⁶ the U.S. contribution is disproportionally high. U.S. concern is mounting that this defense contribution is unrealistic today, particularly Japan's reluctance to spend more than one percent of its Gross National Product (GNP) in its own defense.¹⁷ This, coupled with a growing annual U.S. federal deficit projected to reach \$209 billion this fiscal year,¹⁸ elicits the charge that the Japanese enjoy a "free ride," on defense,¹⁹ and should spend more.²⁰ Could ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation enhance security, cost them little in dollar terms, and make all parties happy?

Finally, recent overtures between Japan and South Korea, including exchange state visits by Prime Minister Nakasone²¹ and President Chun Doo Hwan,²² have lessened animosity between these Asian neighbors.²³ Both leaders stressed good relations and minimized points of contention during these visits. This was highlighted by Emperor Hirohito's regret for the sufferings inflicted on Koreans during the Japanese

¹⁵Japan Defense Agency, Defense, p. 147.

¹⁶International Institute, Balance, p. 103.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁸David R. Francis, "Budget Deficits, Trade, and the Dollar," Christian Science Monitor, 19 February 1985, pp. 6-7.

¹⁹Walter Taylor with Hidehiro Tanakadate, "When Push Comes to Shove With Japan," U.S. News and World Report, 27 June 1983, pp. 35-36.

²⁰T. H. Harvey, Jr., "Japan's Defense Effort," New York Times, 21 March 1984, p. 23.

²¹Takashi Oka, "Japan's Nakasone Explores Common Ground with Korea," Christian Science Monitor, 13 January 1983, p. 5.

²²"What's News," Wall Street Journal, 7 September 1984, p. 1.

²³Takashi Oka, "Japanese Premier to Patch Up Korean Ties Before U.S. Trip," Christian Science Monitor, 7 January 1983, p. 8.

occupation.²⁴ Does this wave of reconciliation signal that the time is right for military cooperation between the two nations?

This thesis reviews the history of the ROK Navy and JMSDF, describes the threats to both, and evaluates domestic, regional and international factors to answer the questions: Is naval cooperation possible? How would each country benefit? When might it occur? What form might it take? What security burdens might the ROK Navy and the JMSDF be reasonably expected to assume from the United States? Is cooperation in the best interest of Asia? What problems can be expected and what can be done about them?

My thesis is that the ROK Navy and JMSDF will likely cooperate under U.S. Navy guidance within the next decade. This cooperation will begin slowly, yet grow significantly through the year 2000 and beyond, easing U.S. security responsibilities in the Far East. The U.S. will retain overall control of this cooperation for the foreseeable future, yet a three-way rotating command structure could eventually replace this arrangement.

Thesis conclusions are based on studies within the framework of today's realities. Consequently, the conclusions may seem undramatic. However, they are based upon not what could happen if all parties agreed to accept radical change, but rather upon the assumption that all parties will want to change the least for the greatest benefit.

²⁴Geoffrey Murray, "North-South Rift Persists Among Koreans in Japan," Christian Science Monitor, 7 September 1984, p. 9.

II. HISTORY OF THE NAVY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

A. ANCIENT HISTORY (668-1907)

The political unification of Korea took place in 668 A.D. Korea is one of the oldest nations in Asia. In East Asia, only China is older.²⁵ While the Korean nation can claim such notable inventions as the moveable type printing press and beautiful celadon porcelain,²⁶ Korea cannot claim, with perhaps one exception, a glorious naval history. In 1231, the Mongols launched a massive invasion from the north and conquered the Koryo armies. The Mongols, then under Kublai Khan, enlisted Koryo in its famed anti-Japanese expeditions mustering Korean men and ships for its ill-fated invasion attempts of 1274 and 1281. In each case, seasonal typhoons destroyed the Koryo-Mongol fleets, giving rise to the Japanese myth of kamikaze or "divine wind."²⁷ In those battles, Koreans were required to provide tremendous quantities of provisions and 900 ships. They also provided 5,000 men in 1274, and 10,000 men in 1281.²⁸

In 1592, with Korea as a battleground, the Japanese fought a naval and ground battle against the Chinese and their Korean allies. The Japanese leader Hideyoshi Toyotomi built a massive invasion force but concentrated solely on the amphibious and transport field. As a result, the relatively unprotected units suffered serious losses at the

²⁵Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, The History of East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958), p. 411.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 420-421.

²⁷Edwin O. Reischauer, The Japanese (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1977), p. 55.

²⁸Reischauer and Fairbank, Great Tradition, p. 424.

hands of Koreans, who, under the command of Admiral Yi Sun-Sin, used very effective "tortoise ships"²⁹ against them.

These ships, purported to have been invented by Admiral Yi Sun-Sin, were the world's first iron-plated ships and looked somewhat like turtles. They sported broadside batteries, reinforced rams, and turtleback main decks covered with spikes. This made them virtually impossible for the Japanese to board. Admiral Yi's forces successfully engaged the Japanese invasion force, severing its all-important supply lines and destroying hundreds of enemy vessels.³⁰

For his bravery and leadership, Admiral Yi became a bona fide national hero, and posthumously received the honorary title of Ch'angma, (loyalty - chivalry.) His memory is honored today in both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea.³¹

Admiral Yi's success was a bright spot in the generally dim history of the Korean Navy. Clark G. Reynolds sums the general political attitude toward naval forces held by many Koreans and Chinese of the era:

Though China...and Korea had relearned the efficacy of naval power, they remained generally continental states concerned with defensive postures and relying upon their armies. They subordinated their navies therefore to the generals and sought to minimize exploitation by the Western traders.³²

²⁹Woo-Keun Han, The History of Korea (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, for the East-West Center, 1974), p. 271.

³⁰Ibid., p. 272.

³¹Neena Vreeland et al., Area Handbook for South Korea (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 17.

³²Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea (New York: Morrow, 1974), p. 134.

Throughout history, until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Korea had virtually no Navy. When the military contributed, it was the Army that played the dominant role. In 1627 and 1637, for example, the Manchus overran the country, further depleting manpower and economic resources.³³ With its military in shambles, the Korean Yi dynasty became a virtual vassal of China's Ch'ing dynasty. Unable to protect itself, Korea relied on China to provide appropriate military responses in times of need.³⁴

By the mid-19th century, Korea feared the power and influence of the Western world in Asia. Events which involved westerners, or were influenced by them, became a source of concern for Korea. The Opium War, 1839-42, Taiping rebellion of 1850, and the opening of Japan by Commodore Perry in 1853,³⁵ are examples.

Korea's answer to this potential Western influence was xenophobic isolationism.³⁶ This isolation was challenged by several countries, of which the most persistent was Japan, which sent missions to Korea in 1868, 1869 and 1871.³⁷ Due, in part, to Korea's belief that Confucian precepts dictated that Japan should deal with China as the senior nation rather than directly with them, these missions were met coolly by Korean officials. After a war-like provocation in 1875 and the failure of China to come to Korea's aid, the Japanese forced an unequal treaty on Korea in 1876. This treaty granted Japanese nationals extra-territorial rights and the opening of three Korean ports to Japanese trade.³⁸

³³Reischauer and Fairbanks, Great Tradition, p. 444.

³⁴Ibid., p. 445.

³⁵Han, History, pp. 350-351.

³⁶Ibid., p. 350.

³⁷Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers, The Far East, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 196.

Hoping to diffuse Japanese influence, China strongly encouraged Korea to open relations with other nations. While the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia all officially established diplomatic relations with Korea during this period, Japan's preeminence was not checked.

By 1894, the Tonghak rebellion demonstrated how anti-foreign, and anti-government Korea had become. In February of that year, one thousand angry farmers destroyed an irrigation system they had been forced to build, broke into an armory, then seized grain from a government warehouse.³⁹ The rebellion created an unrest that both Japan and China felt they should control. Hence, a military confrontation between them began over the internal stability of Korea. Japan won this confrontation handily, resulting in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.⁴⁰

On February 10, 1904, Russia and Japan went to war over rights in Manchuria and Korea, in what was to be a dramatic exemplar of Japanese military power. Two days earlier, Japanese Admiral Togu Heikachiro attacked and crippled the Russian squadron at Port Arthur. The Japanese Army was also effective and successfully engaged the Russians.⁴¹

The Japanese got the upper hand early in the war, which motivated the Russians to seek peace. By the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), Japan received rights to occupy Korea in return for no monetary war reparation from Russia.⁴² From 1905-1910, Korea was a Japanese protectorate: the Japanese took over all Korean diplomatic relations in 1906,⁴³

³⁸ Ibid., p. 196.

³⁹ Han, History, pp. 406-407.

⁴⁰ Claude A. Buss, Asia in the Modern World (New York: Macmillan Co., 1964), p. 155.

⁴¹ Clyde and Beers, Far East, pp. 250-251.

⁴² Clyde and Beers, Far East, p. 253.

⁴³ Han, History, pp. 461-462.

disbanded the Korean armed forces, and forced the abdication of Emperor Kojong, of Korea, in 1907.⁴⁴ The stage was set for the 1910 annexation of Korea by Japan.⁴⁵

B. JAPANESE RULE (1910-1945)

From 1910 to 1945, Korea was ruled directly from Tokyo through a governor general appointed by the Japanese Emperor. Korea became a colony, and was therefore required to support Japan with its agriculture, raw materials, and industrial products. In 1937, Korea was even requested to support its colonial ruler with manpower in the form of a voluntary enlistment of Korean men into the Japanese armed forces. Japan enacted this program because of its increasing military requirements, with the advent of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).⁴⁶ In 1942, this system was changed from voluntary enlistment to conscription. One outgrowth of this period was that those Koreans who served in the Japanese army later became the leadership core in the South Korean Police, Army and Navy after 1945.⁴⁷

C. KOREA DIVIDED (1945-1948)

The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945. Before then the USSR and Japan had maintained a non-belligerent relationship in accordance with the April, 1941, Russo-Japanese Treaty of Neutrality.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 451.

⁴⁵ Clyde and Beers, Far East, p. 261.

⁴⁶ Kyung Cho Chung, Korea: The Third Republic (New York: Macmillan Co., 1971), p. 17.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 17,

⁴⁸ Clyde and Beers, Far East, pp. 389, 391.

From a U.S. perspective, the entry into the Pacific war by the USSR seemed appropriate at the time. The United States was concerned that the final war for control of Japan would be very bloody, costing many American lives. It made sense, therefore, to invite the Soviets, who could share in the burden.⁴⁹ However, requesting Soviet assistance sowed the seeds of future long-term problems on the Korean Peninsula.

When the Russians entered the war, the Japanese were so weak that the Russians were not needed.⁵⁰ It would have been better had they never been invited to participate. Regrettably, this is Monday quarterbacking because few could have predicted that the atom bomb would put the United States in such a favorable position relative to Japan in the war.

Despite the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki which brought home the reality of Japan's imminent defeat and surrender, the Soviets claimed--and correctly, that they should receive compensation for their contribution to ending the war.⁵¹ Consequently Korea was divided at the 38th parallel as a "temporary" demarcation line between the Soviet and the U.S.-controlled portions of the country. While this division was understood to be an interim solution, both North and South Korea attempted to quickly solidify their own positions to deal from a position of strength.⁵²

In the military, the North, under Communist rule, attracted those men who had fought alongside the Soviets and the Communist Chinese, and rejected those who fought with

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 389.

⁵⁰ Woodbridge Bingham, Hilary Conroy and Frank W. Ikle, A History of Asia (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1974), p. 638.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 641.

⁵² Han, History, p. 498.

the Japanese and the Kuomintang (KMT). The Japanese and KMT-trained soldiers fled to the South where they were accepted, and joined the South's Constabulary force which became the precursor of the South Korean army.⁵³ The battle lines between North and South Korea were being drawn.

Following the war, both North and South Korea faced many problems. The industrial base was primarily in the north, while the agricultural base was located in the south.⁵⁴ When Japan surrendered, the booming farm export business from South Korea to Japan decreased because the Japanese could not afford the goods.⁵⁵

This sent the South Korean economy beyond a recession, into a tailspin. South Korea could ill-afford to pay to train an effective military. With no effective military in which to place Koreans who had been fighting for the last several years, the Security Police Force became a large repository for them.⁵⁶

General Hodge, U.S. Army Commander of the American "occupation forces" advocated forming a bona fide Korean military organization. The idea for the establishment of this "Korean Military Defense Unit," as General Hodge referred to it, met with strong opposition from both President Truman and General MacArthur. They believed the forming of this force would cause a negative reaction from the Soviets whom they still considered a nominal ally. A compromise was finally reached in 1946, and a token Reserve Constabulary was formed to fulfill the role of the Korean Armed Forces.⁵⁷

⁵³Buss, Asia, p. 602.

⁵⁴Clyde and Beers, Far East, p. 477.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 477.

⁵⁶Chum-Kon Kim, The Korean War 1950-53 (Seoul, Korea: Kwangmyong Publishing Co., 1973), p. 178.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 178.

The Reserve Constabulary Force was a compromise of the worst kind. Recruiting standards were low. Most sophisticated military hardware was given to the Korean Security Police rather than the Constabulary Force, limiting the effectiveness of the Constabulary.⁵⁸ While the initial group of U.S. service men who "occupied" Korea following the war were not bad troops, they were frequently inexperienced. Their subsequent replacements often were problem soldiers from the occupation troops in Japan.

In 1947, negotiations broke down between the United States and the Soviet Union over the resolution of the 38th Parallel issue. Based on growing tension, the U.S. authorities decided to transform the ROK Constabulary Force into an army and expand it greatly. It increased from a force of 6,000 men in November, 1946, to 50,000 men by the summer of 1948.⁵⁹

The United States submitted the question of a divided Korea to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September, 1947. The General Assembly decided that free elections were a must, and they were scheduled. The Soviets, however, blocked the United Nations Election Commission from entering North Korea to administer the elections. This rendered the entire election a South-only referendum.⁶⁰

On May 31, 1948 Syngman Rhee was elected Speaker of the National Assembly in the South. After a new Constitution was adopted, Rhee was elected President on July 20th. The Republic of Korea was formally proclaimed August 15, 1948, which made way for an increased ROK military buildup.⁶¹

⁵⁸Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics in the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 343-343.

⁵⁹Vreeland, et al., South Korea, p. 345.

⁶⁰Clyde and Beers, Far East, p. 477.

⁶¹Bong-Youn Choy, Korea: A History (Rutland, Vermont:

The ROK Navy was created from the National Maritime Guard, in September, 1948, and started with a few small craft. On November 30, 1948, the Armed Forces Organization Act created the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), comprised of the staff Chiefs of the Army and Navy. The Marine Corps was also founded in 1949, as an independent command.⁶² This gave the Navy official status on a par with the Army.

While the manpower strength of the ROK Army at the start of the Armed Forces Organization Act was 67,558 troops, the Navy had only 7,715 officers and men, which included 1,241 Marine Corps members.⁶³ The Navy had only 28 small ships, including landing craft and mine sweepers. The port facilities used by the Navy included Inchon, Pusan, Mokyo Yosu and Chinhae. The ships were spread between these ports, making it difficult to standardize procedures, training and materiel readiness.⁶⁴

D. KOREAN WAR (1950-1953)

At the outbreak of the Korean War, in June 1950, the ROK had one major ship, a 175 foot training ship, about 30 small coastal patrol ships and only 7500 officers and men. Interestingly this ship, the Bak Du San, was purchased for \$18,000 by the 7,500 officers and men of the ROK Navy, and not the government.⁶⁵ While this number continued to increase throughout the conflict, the few Republic of Korea ships played only a supporting role in the war.⁶⁶

Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1971), p. 275.

⁶²Kim, War, p. 189.

⁶³Ibid., p. 192.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 192.

⁶⁵Raymond V. B. Blackman, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1950-51 (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1951), p. 262.

⁶⁶Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in

The ROK Navy did, however, provide valuable assistance to the U.S. Navy which bore the brunt of the fighting responsibility. That assistance was in the form of at least one ROK Naval officer or senior enlisted personnel assigned to every United Nations ship involved in the Korean conflict.⁶⁷

This ROK liaison officer or petty officer was a key ingredient in the success of the United Nations ship forces in several key warfare assignments, including search and seizure of small DPRK craft and disruption of the fishing industry which was crucial to the survival of the North. The superb work of these ROK liaison personnel is highlighted by the comments of Commander James A. Dare, Commanding Officer of one of the most successful ships during the Korean conflict, the USS Douglas H. Fox (DD-779). While discussing his ship's extraordinary success in the search, seizure and destruction of the DPRK's fishing vessels, he said:

The ROK naval officer, Ensign Un Soo Koo, was a bright, extrovert type. On many occasions he managed to get information from the captured prisoners in about 30 seconds, which was then transmitted to the ship by radio. One time, he convinced two prisoners, caught 30 minutes earlier, to help spot gunfire on the loading piers and warehouses behind Mayang-do. (I am not certain the prisoners weren't spotting our fire onto their creditors' homes.)⁶⁸

At war's end, the ROK Navy had lost one ship like the Bak Du San; two minesweepers, including a third damaged beyond repair; one Auxiliary minelayer; and one motor torpedo boat, all to enemy mines.⁶⁹

Korea (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), p. 69.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 322.

⁶⁸Quoted in Cagle and Manson, Sea War, p. 345.

⁶⁹Raymond V. B. Blackman, ed. Jane's Fighting Ships 1953-54 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1953), p. 252.

The Korean conflict conclusively demonstrated that the dominant sea power in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea possesses a significant advantage in any conflict on the Korean Peninsula. United Nations forces during the Korean War, including ships from Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the United States, neutralized any sea borne threat from the DPRK. As the authors of The Sea War in Korea conclude vis-a-vis that assurance of control:

Without command of the seas between the Free World and Korea, and in the waters adjacent to that beleaguered peninsula, the Korean War, as fought, most certainly would have been lost both militarily and politically with a finality that would now be plain to every American. Operations by ground and air forces were completely dependent on a steady flow of personnel and supplies, the bulk of which came across the vast Pacific ocean. This conclusion is substantiated by these factors:

1. Six of every seven people who went to Korea went by sea.
2. Fifty-four million tons of dry cargo, 22 million tons of petroleum products went to Korea by ship.
3. Every soldier landed in Korea was accompanied by five tons of equipment, and it took 64 pounds every day to keep him there.
4. For every ton of trans-Pacific air freight, there were 270 tons of trans-Pacific sea freight. For every ton of air freight, four tons of gasoline for the airplanes had to be delivered across the Pacific by ship.⁷⁰

E. ROK NAVY (1953-1970S)

The United Nations Command signed the Armistice Agreement with Communist forces on July 27, 1953. After thirty seven months and two days of fighting, that cost the United States alone 142,091 casualties and almost twenty

⁷⁰Cagle and Manson, Sea War, pp. 491-92.

billion dollars.⁷¹ Immediately after the signing of the Armistice, the ROK Navy took over operational authority from the United Nations command and assumed the coastal defense responsibility of the Republic.⁷²

Since that time, the ROK Navy has strengthened its combat capabilities and tonnage by acquiring mostly former U.S. Navy equipment, and adopting U.S. Navy training. Major equipment acquisitions have included escort destroyers and larger combat destroyers in the 1960's⁷³ a fleet of Landing Tracked Vehicles (LVTs), helicopters and high-speed patrol boats in the 1970's⁷⁴ and more sophisticated fire control and missile systems in the 1980's.⁷⁵

Though small in size, the ROK Navy is an important link in the security of South Korea. This is a contrast to the Japanese, who question not only the value of their Maritime Self-Defense Force, but also the very legality of its existence.⁷⁶ To understand this comparison between the Republic of Korea, which has not enjoyed a very distinguished naval tradition, and the Japanese, who have long understood the power of the sea, a view of Japanese Naval history is valuable.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 490.

⁷²Choy, History, p. 301.

⁷³Raymond V. B. Blackman, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1969-70 (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1969), pp. 197-200.

⁷⁴John Moore, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1979-80 (New York: Jane's Yearbooks, Franklin Watts, 1979), pp. 322-328.

⁷⁵John Moore, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1984-85 (New York: Jane's Publishing Co., 1984), pp. 310-317.

⁷⁶Geoffrey Murray, "Pacifism Reigns in Japan as US Pushes It to Rearm," Christian Science Monitor, 23 March 1983, pp. 1 and 14.

III. JAPANESE NAVAL HISTORY

A. ANCIENT HISTORY

Japan has long enjoyed a rich heritage with the Sea. Because of its island nation status, no traveler could enter or leave Japan but by the sea. As early as 200 A. D., Japan is believed to have been overrun by "waves of ...invaders from the Korean Peninsula."⁷⁷ By the 6th century, there was a heavy flow of waterborne traffic and cultural influences into Japan from China.⁷⁸ Japan recognized early the military value of the sea.

In 1263, Kublai Khan conquered Korea and aspired to the conquest of Japan.⁷⁹ An attempt to conquer Japan was made in 1274, but failed because heavy weather destroyed the conquerors.⁸⁰ In 1281 A. D., the Mongols assembled the greatest overseas expedition the world had ever seen to that point, and sailed it into the jaws of a typhoon.⁸¹ The Mongols were destroyed by the typhoon which became legend for the Japanese, and strengthened their belief that their country was protected by divine providence.

In 1592, the Japanese attempted to turn the tables by conquering Korea with great naval and land forces. Japan did not succeed and finally withdrew after their great warrior, Hideyoshi, died in 1598.⁸²

⁷⁷Reischauer, Japanese, p. 42.

⁷⁸Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p. 17.

⁷⁹Buss, Asia, p. 34.

⁸⁰Reischauer and Fairbank Great Tradition, p. 424.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 34.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 35-36.

Shortly thereafter, Japan became fearful of spiritual, cultural and political pollution from the outside world and closed its doors to all foreigners in 1638.⁸³ To violate this law was to die. The only important exception was the annual Dutch trading expedition from Indonesia to the island of Deshima.⁸⁴ This ban was officially lifted after Commodore Perry sailed into Edo Bay in 1853.

The following years saw Japan make much change in governmental policy.⁸⁵ A British fleet destroyed Yokohama in 1863, following the execution of an Englishman, and an allied fleet leveled Choshu forts in 1864. Japan's leadership took note.⁸⁶

The ensuing years brought war with China, that ended in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895); war with Russia (1904-05); and World War I (1914-1918). Each of these conflicts demonstrated that sea power was valuable for an emerging world power.

B. WORLD WAR II

On December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor Day, the Japanese had a fleet second to perhaps only the United States. It was considered the largest, and most advanced of its kind.⁸⁷ By the end of the war, Japan's Navy had suffered many losses, but could still be considered formidable by any standard.⁸⁸ On August 14, 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam Proclamation,

⁸³ John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 179.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 179

⁸⁵ Clyde and Beers, Far East, p. 125.

⁸⁶ Reischauer, Japanese, p. 124.

⁸⁷ Clark G. Reynolds, The Carrier War (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1982), p. 38.

⁸⁸ Francis E. McMurtrie, ed. Jane's Fighting Ships 1944-45 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947), pp. 296-332.

which called for the surrender and occupation of Japan. The occupation forces led by General Douglas MacArthur were directed by President Truman to ensure that:

...the Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives...We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners...Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted...We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.⁸⁹

From this point, the Japanese Navy was quickly dismantled. The largest ships, including seven carriers, three battleships, twelve cruisers and three auxiliaries were scrapped or sunk. Some 135 other ships and small craft were given away to Allied Navies and the Merchant Marines.⁹⁰ The only area of Japan's once mighty fleet that remained with sufficient numbers to be considered a force, was mine-sweeping ships, that later played an important role in the Korean War.

The Japanese Constitution, drafted by General MacArthur's own staff after the General rejected the initial Japanese proposals, was the foundation for preventing Japan from significantly contributing to its own defense. Article

⁸⁹The Potsdam Proclamation, quoted in Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The Record of American Diplomacy, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 672.

⁹⁰James E. Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of the Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 42.

IX, entitled, "The Renunciation of War," renounced forever the ability to engage in war and the maintenance of "land, sea, and air forces as well as other war potential."⁹¹

The predicable outcome of this Constitution was a Japan that no longer had to be concerned with self-defense. Other factors did push the Japanese into maintenance of at least a small coastal naval force. Two of these factors, smuggling and illegal immigration, required the Japanese to develop a coastal patrol force that could protect the homeland. This force was small (28 former Japanese submarine chasers), and underpowered, to the extent that they were frequently outrun and outgunned by the smugglers they were supposed to be controlling.⁹²

C. THE KOREAN WAR PERIOD

The Korean War of June 25, 1950, caused a major re-evaluation in the U.S.-backed, Japanese-supported disarmament policy of the post-war years. Japan's minesweeping fleet was enlisted to clear mined areas off of Korea. The Japanese did this with great professionalism, losing only two of 46 minesweepers and one Japanese life.⁹³

More far-reaching was the U.S. administration's understanding that a defenseless Japan left a dangerous void in the security of the entire Pacific. After General MacArthur was required to remove most of the occupation force from Japan to fight in the Korean conflict, he required then Prime Minister Yoshida to establish a 75,000 man National Police Reserve. Yoshida thought this force was merely to maintain Japanese internal security, however, Secretary of State Dulles thought differently. He

⁹¹Reischauer, Story, pp. 227-228.

⁹²Auer, Postwar, p. 57.

⁹³Ibid., p. 66.

maintained that a mutual defense agreement between Japan and the U.S. could only be possible if Japan rearmed to assume primary responsibility for defense against a Soviet attack, and assist in regional security matters. He defined this as a 350,000-man military force.⁹⁴

Prime Minister Yoshida refused to comply with Dulles' plan. This disagreement resulted in the 1951 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Act. This Act permitted the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, thus providing for the establishment of stop-gap security based on U.S. forces.⁹⁵ Some 34 years later, this stop-gap security based on U.S. forces is still in place.

During this same period, discussions were taking place in the U.S. to determine how we could assist the Japanese to begin building a credible, self-defense "Navy." General Matthew B. Ridgway, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), decided that Japan would be offered a force of 68 vessels: 18 patrol frigates and 50 large support/landing ships. The patrol frigates were those returned to the U.S. by the Soviet Union following the war and were located in Yokosuka harbor, while the 50 landing craft were in the U.S. Prime Minister Yoshida accepted this offer.⁹⁶ Thus, the restoration of the Japanese Navy began.

Although not in agreement with all Secretary Dulles demanded from Japan in a mutual security treaty arrangement, Prime Minister Yoshida recognized Japan would have to contribute more to its own defense. Therefore, in the spring of 1952, he reorganized the National Police Reserve

⁹⁴James H. Buck, ed., The Modern Japanese Military System (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 43.

⁹⁵Clyde and Beers, Far East, p. 427.

⁹⁶Auer, Postwar Rearmament, p. 81.

and expanded its membership. Renamed the National Safety Agency, it was comprised of two military arms: the National Safety Force, and the Maritime Safety Board.

D. THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT

In March, 1954, after long discussion, the Yoshida government concluded the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States. This agreement provided a legal basis for furnishing U.S. equipment to support Japanese requirements under the 1951 Mutual Security Act and was landmark in U.S.-Japan security relations, because it acknowledged some self-defense responsibility by Japan, yet emphasized Japan's limitations:

...(Japan is required) to fulfill the military obligations...assumed under the Security Treaty...(and to) make, consistent with the political and economic stability of Japan, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition of the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world.⁹⁷

The latitude to escape this responsibility was provided for in that same agreement.

In the planning of a defense assistance program for Japan, economic stability will be an essential element for consideration in the development of its defense capacities, and that Japan can contribute only to the extent permitted by its general economic condition and capacities.⁹⁸

While the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was negotiated, efforts were made to revitalize the Japanese Navy. Under the agreement, a loan of fifteen ships was

⁹⁷Quoted in Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 74-75.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 75.

negotiated. The Japanese received eight destroyers, one submarine, four tank-landing ships, numerous minesweepers and other vessels from the United States. Though these ships were loaned, the U.S. amended the loans to make them "grant aid," so the Japanese could keep the ships.⁹⁹

A problem still had to be overcome before the Navy could achieve legitimacy. The Japanese Constitution's Article IX did not permit Japan to have a military force. Yet the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement called for Japan to defend itself commensurate with its financial ability to support that defense. This contradiction was solved by Prime Minister Yoshida in the summer of 1954, when, after a long and acrimonious fight in the Diet, he won support for the Defence Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law. This law created the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and redefined the Maritime Safety Board (later the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA)) to become like the U.S. Coast Guard.¹⁰⁰

E. THE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

From 1954 to 1956, the newly formed MSDF attempted to consolidate their forces and improve their capabilities. By late 1956, the MSDF was comprised of 28 destroyers, one submarine, 49 mine warfare craft, and various other craft.¹⁰¹ The Maritime Safety Board also expanded and armed 46 small patrol vessels and acquired seven large vessels (1,000 tons) by the close of 1956.¹⁰²

⁹⁹Auer, Postwar Rearmament, p. 95.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 99.

¹⁰¹Blackman, Jane's Ships 1956-57, p. 286.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 284.

A shortcoming during this period was the lack of any specified mission for the MSDF. This problem was addressed with the founding of the National Defense Council in 1956. By May, 1957, the recommendations submitted by the Council were approved by the Cabinet. The basic policy was defined as follows:

The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence,¹⁰³ and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles.

While this did not include specific tasking, it did delineate general guidelines under which the MSDF could operate.

In another attempt to define the direction of the MSDF, the National Defense Council prepared a five-year defense plan for the years 1956 - 1960, which called for a fleet of 211 ships. Shortly after, a building program was approved to support this plan. The decision was made to build Japanese ships, when possible, rather than purchase U.S.-built models. However, U.S. designs and U.S. topside weapons were frequently used in those early years.¹⁰⁴

By 1960, the MSDF had 57 major surface combatants, two submarines, and 142 other ships. The Maritime Safety Agency also grew to seven large patrol ships and 97 medium and small vessels.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³Ted Shannon Wile, "Sea-lane Defense: An Emerging Role for the JMSDF?" (Master's Degree thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September, 1981), p. 22.

¹⁰⁴Weinstein, Postwar, p. 158.

¹⁰⁵Blackman, Raymond V. B., ed. Jane's Fighting Ships 1960-61 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), p. 210.

F. THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY

1960 was an important year in the development of the MSDF because of the ratification of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the U.S. This treaty was a landmark in Japan-U.S. relations, for it signalled the character of the relationship that would exist in U.S.-Japan defense relationships for years to come. In Articles V and VI, the treaty established the U.S. as the military defender of Japan as a matter of joint U.S.-Japan interest. Further, the treaty granted U.S. military basing rights in Japanese territory.¹⁰⁶

Article V also implied mutuality in defense matters by stating that defensive action would be taken in the event of "an armed attack against either Party." Yet a closer examination reveals the phrase "in the territories under the administration of Japan."¹⁰⁷ Therein lay the rub. The U.S. was fully committed to the defense of Japan, as was Japan, itself. In this treaty, no one was committed to the defense or security of the U.S. The treaty more accurately should have been called the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation for the Security of Japan, rather than the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security.

This treaty was recognized as an exceptionally favorable arrangement for Japan by Nobusuke Kishi, then Prime Minister of Japan. He felt so strongly about it, that he rammed it through the governmental approval process with an early morning vote when his opponents were not on the floor of the House of Representatives. Though the Treaty was approved, Prime Minister Kishi was vilified for his tactless style. In 1960, huge demonstrations protested the Treaty and U.S.-Japan cooperation, but were actually targeted at

¹⁰⁶Reischauer, Japanese, p. 113.

¹⁰⁷Japan Defense Agency, Defense, p. 224.

Kishi's tactics and personal style. Due to the uproar surrounding the Treaty, Prime Minister Kishi was forced to leave office in July, 1960.¹⁰⁸

It is curious that the treaty for which Prime Minister Kishi was vilified, actually ensured Japan's opportunity for economic success. By placing the lion's share of security burden on the backs of the Americans, Japan could concern itself with making money rather than making weapons. This they did with great enthusiasm.

¹⁰⁸Clyde and Beers, Far East, p. 471.

IV. THE THREAT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the Republic of Korea's most fearsome enemy, and with good reason. See Appendix B for a summary of North Korean forces. With a total of 784,500 million armed forces, the DPRK has the third largest military in the Far East, behind only the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.¹⁰⁹ With a population of 41.6 million, South Korea is over twice the size of North Korea, (population: 19.6 million). Yet it is the North that maintains over 160,000 more active military personnel than the South.¹¹⁰ More significantly, the North has demonstrated the will to use that military to achieve their objectives. The Korean war, the Panmunjom axe murders, the seizing of the USS Pueblo and crew, and the Rangoon bombing are but a few examples that illustrate this.

By using a combination of Soviet and PRC backing, the North has been able to amass an impressive arsenal of equipment. When compared with the South, the North has some distinctive advantages. For example, with a 25 percent overall larger ground force, significant advantage in armored forces (2.1:1 in medium tanks, and 1.8:1 in armored personnel carriers), overwhelming superiority in rocket launchers (leading by over 2,000) and huge amounts of pre-positioned war stocks, the North Korean Army has a larger, very capable ground force.¹¹¹ Its forces are highly motivated, well-trained and -equipped, and have more capability

¹⁰⁹Japan Defense Agency, Defense, p. 29.

¹¹⁰International Institute, Balance, pp. 102-103.

¹¹¹Ibid., pp. 102-103.

in chemical and biological warfare than do the ROK forces.¹¹²

However, the two greatest advantages enjoyed by the North have nothing to do with equipment or manpower at all. They are the element of surprise, and the short distance of only forty kilometers from the Demilitarized Zone to Seoul.

The ability to pick the time and place of an invasion is a crucial issue. This advantage, coupled with Seoul's vulnerable geographic position, has guided the North to configure its forces for offensive operations. Highly mobile armed forces, supported by airborne elements make North Korea's forces more threatening. As Richard Sneider aptly states:

The South, on the other hand, is unable to trade distance for stronger defensive positions; it must defend all the major corridors of attack very close to the DMZ, which requires it to spread its defensive forces. The North's emphasis on airborne operations and tunnel-digging is apparently designed to strengthen its capabilities for a surprise attack that would neutralize the DMZ defenses of the South.¹¹³

The North Korean Air Force has the upper hand in quantity (1.7:1), yet this is an empty fact when the capabilities of individual pilots and aircraft are compared. The North Korean Air Force is comprised predominantly of MIG-15/-17/-19 aircraft of 1950's and 1960's vintage.¹¹⁴ While they do have over 150 MIG-21's (1960's technology), this aircraft proved no match for the United States' F-4 series during confrontations in Vietnam. The North does have the

¹¹²Christopher F. Foss, Jane's Armour and Artillery 1984-85, 5th ed. (London: Jane's Publishing, 1984), p. 62 and pp. 113-115.

¹¹³Richard L. Sneider, "Prospects for Korean Security," Asian Security in the 1980's, Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition. Richard H. Solomon, ed. (Rand, November, 1979), pp. 117-118.

¹¹⁴International Institute, Balance, p. 103.

advantages of surprise and short distance to Seoul, more significant in air warfare than in ground attack.

The South definitely has superior quality hardware and training on their side. The F-4 is the only truly "all weather" fighter on the Korean peninsula (excluding the in-country U.S. operated F-16).¹¹⁵ The F-5 E/F, which the South has in great number, can fly rings around any aircraft the North possesses.¹¹⁶ United States-directed training of South Korean pilots, has made them the best in the region. The South can rely on the accuracy of precision-directed munitions, and the all-hemisphere air-to-air missiles to neutralize Northern targets. This affords greater percentage of success than the North, which has "iron bombs" and less sophisticated antiair missiles.¹¹⁷

In short, although the North possesses more aircraft and equipment than the South, they are far less effective than the South's. Even when the element of surprise is added to the equation in favor of the North, it is doubtful that the North could ever gain air superiority over the South.

In evaluating the Navy, the North enjoys superior numbers of Naval platforms. However, unlike the case of the North Korean Air Force, where larger numbers of older aircraft meant little when faced with more effective ROK Air Force aircraft, the number of North Korean vessels must be viewed with concern by the South. The North has little or no long-range naval power projection capability, yet it has an effective coastal surveillance and defense Navy. The majority of North Korea's naval units are less than seven

¹¹⁵ John W. R. Taylor, ed. Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1977-78 (New York: Jane's Yearbooks, Franklin Watts, 1977), pp. 342-343.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 362.

¹¹⁷ John W. R. Taylor, ed. Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1983-84, (London: Jane's Publishing Co., 1984), p. 790.

years old, while many in South Korea's fleet are of World War II vintage.¹¹⁸ The ROK Navy has larger ships, and a more sophisticated surface-to-surface antishipping missile in the Harpoon, yet the North has the benefit of many more missiles, torpedoes and guns to neutralize the South's qualitative advantage. The North also has 21 attack submarines, while the South has none.¹¹⁹

Scenarios of a Northern invasion of South Korea often find the Republic of Korea Navy playing only a limited role, including antishipping operations, special forces insertion, naval gunfire for support, and protection of the homeland. Within the confines of these limited Northern goals, there is evidence that the North's superior numbers could/would overcome the South's qualitative advantage and thus be successful in achieving its goals.

¹¹⁸ Thomas B. Hayward, "The Military Balance in the Pacific-Asian Region," paper presented at the Sixth Soviet-American Conference on Contemporary Asia, Alma-Ata, USSR, 27 May-1 June 1984, p. 13.

¹¹⁹ International Institute, Balance, pp. 102-103.

V. THE SOVIET THREAT

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) has demonstrated that it intends to be recognized as a great world power. See Appendix C for a summary of Soviet forces in the Far East. Since the early 1970's, the Soviet Navy has played an important role in this emergence. USSR ships have become larger, and their technology more sophisticated.¹²⁰ Once considered a coastal Navy with little sea power projection capability, the Soviet Navy has grown into the world's second most powerful navy, inferior only to the United States.¹²¹

The Soviets have used their Navy to further their national aspirations. The U.S. Department of Defense correctly asserts: "The Navy's power mobility and capability for worldwide deployment give it the ability to support Soviet state interests abroad to a degree unmatched by other branches of Soviet military."¹²² This policy is nothing new or unique to the Soviets. Great Britain and the United States used naval power to promote their foreign policy goals long before the Soviets decided to. The Soviet Union did learn from history that a true world power must also have sea power projection capability. The Soviets now have such a capability.

Nowhere is this more observable than in the Pacific. The Soviet Pacific fleet is the largest of its four fleets, with 88 principle surface combatants, including 2 Minsk-class aircraft carriers, 31 ballistic missile

¹²⁰Department of Defense, Soviet, p. 97.

¹²¹John Moore, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1984-85 (New York: Jane's Publishing, 1984), pp. 129 and 131.

¹²²Department of Defense, Soviet, p. 91.

submarines, 102 non-ballistic missile submarines, 220 minor combatants, 18 amphibious ships, 84 major auxiliary support ships, and 340 combat aircraft, including bombers.¹²³ Complementing this impressive naval power is a land army 53 divisions strong, with 14,900 tanks, a tactical air force of 1,690 aircraft, and 135 new SS-20 medium-range nuclear missiles¹²⁴ stationed on the Chinese border. Two additional light divisions of troops are located on the island of Sakhalin.¹²⁵ To round out this impressive array of forces, the USSR has Naval Facilities located in Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk, Sovyetshoya Gavan, and access rights in Vietnam (Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay), South Yemen (Aden, Socotra) and Ethiopia (Dahlak Island).¹²⁶

Of particular concern is the base at Cam Ranh Bay. From this location the Soviets can project huge military might with TU-16 Badger bombers and 20-25 surface ships.¹²⁷ In the Fall of 1983, ships from this base and other Soviet bases around the globe participated in the first Soviet world-wide naval exercise since 1975. This exercise was comprehensive in scope, and included a focus on disruption of sea-lanes of communication and convoy operations in the South China Sea. The exercise demonstrated the Soviets' capability to project world-wide power and to disrupt the flow of shipping through

¹²³International Institute, Balance, p. 21.

¹²⁴Department of Defense, Soviet, p. 15.

¹²⁵Geoffrey Murray, "Tokyo Worries Soviet SS-20's May Swing East," Christian Science Monitor, 21 January 1983, pp. 1 and 7.

¹²⁶Department of Defense, Soviet, pp. 106-107.

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 66.

¹²⁸Japan Defense Agency, Defense, p. 10.

the South China Sea.¹²⁸ Even a minor disruption, with attendant increase in insurance rates and slow-down of shipping would be expensive to Japan and South Korea, which depend on freedom of the seas for financial livelihood.

The Soviets are not satisfied with their impressive array of forces and continue to improve and expand them. They are currently producing or testing nine different classes of submarines. Of these, all but one is nuclear powered.¹²⁹ Construction has started on a new Soviet 65,000 ton aircraft carrier, due out by the early 1990's, that will operate a new generation of high performance combat aircraft.¹³⁰ They already operate the world's largest air cushion vehicle, which has the speed and maneuverability to greatly enhance amphibious forces capability.¹³¹

Why this significant effort to improve an already impressive capability? One possible answer is that the Soviets believe the Far East holds the key to the future. If trade with the United States is a yardstick that the Soviets use to measure importance, then the Far East is the most important area of the world. Asian trade today accounts for about 30 percent of all U.S. foreign trade. Trade with our largest partner in the region, Japan, exceeds U.S. trade with the United Kingdom, West Germany and France, combined.¹³² This tremendous Far East trade, is almost exclusively transported by ships. A wartime disruption of the high seas lines of communication would have a devastating effect on free trade, and on the security of the free world.

¹²⁹Department of Defense, Soviet, p. 95.

¹³⁰Japan Defense Agency, Defense, p. 10.

¹³¹Department of Defense, Soviet, p. 102.

¹³²R. L. J. Long, "The Pacific Theatre: Key to Global Stability," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," ed. Claude A. Buss. Hoover Institution, Stanford California, 1984, p. 38.

Does that mean that the Soviet Union must start a war in the Far East to realize their goals? The answer is, "no." Through gunboat diplomacy emanating from Cam Rahn Bay and Vladovostock,¹³³ and threats of additional SS-20 missile deployment from Moscow,¹³⁴ the real hope of the Soviets is to drive a wedge between the United States and its Asian allies. Their hope is to convince our allies that the United States, not the Soviets, is the real threat. This is true, they claim, because the U.S. is the provocateur that requires the Soviets to aim nuclear weapons at Asia. If the U.S. was out of Asia, the Soviets could remove their defensive nuclear weapons and all would be safe.¹³⁵

The Soviets possess the capability to threaten the economic and social security of the Far East. This capability, real today, continues to expand with further Soviet weapons deployment.

How well are the ROK Navy and the JMSDF equipped to counter the DPRK and Soviet threats? To answer, we will look at the Navy of the Republic of Korea and the JMSDF as they are today.

¹³³ Japan Defense Agency, Defense, pp. 26-27.

¹³⁴ Geoffrey Murray, "Tokyo Worries Soviet SS-20's May Swing East," Christian Science Monitor, 21 January 1983, pp. 1 and 7.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 1.

VI. THE NAVY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN 1985

The contemporary ROK Navy continues to be a moderate- to small-sized Navy, with the primary objective of coastline defense. Its equipment and training are a mixture of U.S. Navy "hand-me-downs" and some modern upgrades. See Appendix D for a summary of all Republic of Korea forces.

A. MANPOWER AND MATERIEL

The Navy is composed of 29,000 Naval personnel and 20,000 Marine Corps personnel, who are all volunteers and must serve at least three years after enlisting.¹³⁶ The ROK Navy has 19 principal combatants with 11 destroyers, and 8 frigates, all (less one frigate) former U.S. Navy World War II vintage ships. In addition, the Navy has 10 corvettes, 9 missile-capable fast attack craft, 40+ smaller patrol craft, 8 minesweepers, 16 amphibious ships, 2 stores ships, 6 fuel tankers, and 30 Coast Guard vessels.¹³⁷ There is speculation, yet unconfirmed, that the first Korean submarine built in the Republic of Korea entered service in 1983.¹³⁸

While most of the ROK Navy's equipment is older U.S. type, the ships are in excellent material readiness condition and should give many more years of effective service. They have been upgraded, with the addition of more modern sensors and weapons systems as the SPS-40 long-range air search radar, Harpoon surface to surface missile, helicopter

¹³⁶International Institute, Balance, pp. 103-104.

¹³⁷Ibid., p. 104.

¹³⁸Moore, Jane's Ships 1984-85, pp. 310.315.

decks, and 20 mm Vulcan gattling gun close-in weapon system (CIWS).¹³⁹

The 20mm Vulcan gattling gun CIWS is particularly important because it improves the anti-air warfare capability of these ships. It is a sophisticated anti-air-warfare weapon system that can fire at 2,000 rounds per minute. With its own radar tracking and acquisition system, the CIWS is a self-contained unit, that can be placed on any surface platform, regardless of the age of that platform.¹⁴⁰

ROK Navy ships are limited in their overall warfare capability by their age, which necessitates constant care for satisfactory operational readiness. This limitation is overcome in the "Ulsan class" frigate, the one non-U.S. destroyer/frigate that the ROK Navy owns. Built in the Republic of Korea in 1980, the Ulsan class combines a modern gas-turbine and diesel engineering plant, good anti-air warfare capability with the Oto Melara rapid-fire 76 mm gun, and eight Emerson twin 30 mm guns, excellent surface to surface missile capability in the Exocet missile, and good anti-submarine warfare capabilities with the medium frequency PAS-32 sonar, and MK-44 torpedoes. Originally, four of these ships were scheduled to be built, but the remaining three were cancelled due to funding constraints. This design will likely be the basis for a ROK prototype, scheduled for construction in the late 1980's to replace its fleet of aging U.S. destroyers.¹⁴¹

The air arm of the ROK Navy is dedicated almost entirely to anti-submarine warfare. The current inventory includes 16 S-2 E/F Tracker anti-submarine aircraft, 12 Alouette III

¹³⁹Ibid., p. 310-315.

¹⁴⁰R. T. Pretty, ed., Jane's Weapon Systems 1977, 8th ed. (New York: Jane's Yearbooks, Franklin Watts, 1976), p. 149.

¹⁴¹Moore, Jane's Ships 1984-85, p. 310.

helicopters (operated by the ROK Marine Corps), approximately 10 utility aircraft for general purposes, and an additional six reconditioned S-2 E/F aircraft just delivered.¹⁴² These antisubmarine warfare aircraft have fair-to-good capability, but cannot be favorably compared with the more modern U.S. Navy P-3C and the carrier-based S-3 aircraft.

The primary mission of the ROK surface navy is to protect against DPRK infiltration by sea. To accomplish this, the ROK Navy has over 80 surface fast-attack or patrol craft. This mission is difficult and requires professionalism and patience. Small fishing boats can easily be confused when observed on radar. Visual identification and search is, therefore, required to ensure these boats are not carrying infiltrators.

Given the large numbers of DPRK submarines, aircraft, and fast patrol boats, more traditional warfare areas of anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and anti-surface warfare (ASUW) are also important to the ROK Navy.

In anti-air warfare (AAW), the ROK is in poor condition. Its front-line ships, former U.S. destroyers and frigates, have no sophisticated surface-to-air missile systems. Their main batteries are five-inch 38 guns which are accurate for shore bombardment, but fire too slowly for effective AAW. The CIWS improves upon the capability, but only provides short-range protection against enemy missiles. With no fighter or attack aircraft in the Naval aviation arm, the ROK Navy must depend on either the ROK Air Force or U.S. fighter aircraft to neutralize enemy air power.¹⁴³ This poses an inter-service or inter-governmental coordination

¹⁴²International Institute, Balance, p. 104.

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 310.

problem that could preclude accomplishment of ROK Navy AAW priorities in a warfare environment.

In anti-submarine warfare, the ROK Navy is in better condition. ROK destroyers and frigates carry middle frequency range, active sonar equipment, that is best suited to tracking quiet running diesel electric submarines. This is appropriate, given that the DPRK has 21 diesel-electric submarines and zero nuclear-powered submarines.¹⁴⁴ The ROK Navy S-2 Tracker aircraft E/F can provide fair-to-good fixed wing ASW localization, although better, more modern systems exist in the P-3C and the S-3.¹⁴⁵ The Alouette helicopters provide a good launch platform for the MK-44 ASW torpedo, yet have essentially no effective submarine localization equipment.¹⁴⁶

The MK-44 homing torpedo, main battle torpedo for the ROK Navy, is an inferior weapon compared to the U.S. Navy MK-46 and should be immediately replaced in the ROK inventory. Currently, there is no plan to do this. This is not as serious as it may seem. Torpedo launch criteria in a warfare situation against a diesel-electric submarine is achieved in close quarters and at short range, at 500 - 1000 yards. In this situation, the MK-44 is a generally good weapon with fair "kill" probability.¹⁴⁷

The ROK Navy is satisfactorily armed to counter the diesel-electric submarine threat, if units are deployed to give the ROK Navy a two- surface ship to-one submarine advantage. Since the DPRK has 21 submarines, to only 19 major ROK ASW ships, this ratio will seldom be achieved.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 103.

¹⁴⁵Taylor, Jane's Aircraft 1980-81, pp. 371-373.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁴⁷Pretty, Jane's Weapon Systems 1977, pp. 134-135.

In anti-surface ship warfare, the ROK is in good shape. The ROK Navy destroyers and frigates definitely out-gun their opponents in the DPRK. The five inch-38 is an excellent anti-ship gun and can be relied upon to be effective in any surface duel between the ROK and DPRK.¹⁴⁸ Additionally, the 2 Harpoon, 9 standard missile (with no AAW capability), and 3 Exocet-equipped ships provide an up-to-date and effective long-range anti-surface ship capability.¹⁴⁹ Taken in total, the ROK Navy can be proud of this area of warfare.

B. TRAINING AND READINESS

The calibre of officer in the ROK Navy is high. As with the Army and the Air Force, the ROK Navy looks mainly to its service academy to provide its career officer leadership. Midshipmen are selected by rigorous examination from among high school honor graduates. Upon graduation from the ROK Naval Academy, midshipmen are awarded a Bachelor of Science degree and a commission in the ROK Navy.

In-service education plays a large part in forming the leadership elite in the Navy. The Naval War College provides a ten-month curriculum that is essential for the ROK Navy's rising stars. The Armed Forces Staff College, in Seoul, offers a three month course given to a small, select group of officers from the three services. Upon completion of the course, those attending are earmarked for senior rank. Finally, the National Defense College is the pinnacle of the formal military instruction and prepares senior officers for the rigors of Flag and General rank.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 134-135.

¹⁴⁹International Institute, Balance, p. 103.

¹⁵⁰Vreeland, South Korea, p. 359.

The ROK Navy's enlisted personnel are all volunteers, who sign on initially for three years. The Naval Training Center at Chinhae administers a three month basic training course that is effective as a military indoctrination tool. Subsequent specialty training is received by the enlisted personnel to further their specific shipboard systems knowledge.¹⁵¹

Discipline, pride and hard work are required of both sailors and officers in the ROK Navy. Their ships reflect this hard training and are some of the cleanest I have ever seen.¹⁵² Their pride and professionalism is evident and they openly desire to emulate the U.S. Navy and learn from our traditions.

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 359.

¹⁵²Author toured two Korean destroyers, the Jeon Buk (DD-916) and the Kwang Ju (DD-921) in October, 1979, and found them to be in outstanding material condition and spotless.

VII. JAPANESE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE TODAY

Since 1960, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has slowly expanded into a modern, albeit small Naval Force, built to enhance the efforts of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to ensure Japanese security. Most of the MSDF's 32 Destroyers, 18 Frigates, and 14 Patrol Submarines are relatively new, having been built by the Japanese in the 1970's or later.¹⁵³ The modernization of the MSDF has addressed areas of past weakness in the force and improved upon them. See Appendix E for a summary of all Japanese forces.

A. ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE

Recognizing that guns are no match for Soviet longer range anti-ship missiles, the U.S. Harpoon missile has been placed on two "Hatsuyuki" class Destroyers, one Ishikari-class frigate and the newest Yuushio-class submarine. Other ships are being retrofitted to enable them to carry the Harpoon. Construction is underway of six more Harpoon equipped Hatsuyuki-class destroyers, one more Ishikari-class frigate and three more Yuushio-class submarines.¹⁵⁴ While this ASUW upgrade program is encouraging, it is not enough to combat the USSR's 88 principal combatants assigned to the Pacific fleet.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³Moore, Jane's Ships 1984-85, pp. 281-288.

¹⁵⁴Ibid., p. 279.

¹⁵⁵International Institute, Balance, p. 21.

B. ANTI-AIR WARFARE

Anti-air warfare is an area of weakness in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. This problem is being addressed with the addition of the aforementioned U.S. radar-controlled Gattling gun, the Close-in Weapons System (CIWS), and the Sea Sparrow missile system to several surface units. More important, because of its much longer 25 nautical mile range, is the inclusion of the U.S. SM-1MR surface-to-air missile (SAM) in three Tachikaze-class destroyers and one Amatsukaze destroyer.¹⁵⁶

When confronting the Soviets, an effective anti-air warfare capability is the most important self-defense requirement. With over 1200 anti-ship missile launchers on board their ships, submarines and naval aircraft,¹⁵⁷ the Soviets' most prevalent and effective weapon is the anti-ship missile. The greatest concern of attack in time of war, comes from the anti-ship missile, regardless of the platform: air, surface, or subsurface that launched it. While the JMSDF has improved its AAW capability, it is not adequately protected to fend off a protracted Soviet anti-ship missile attack.

C. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

The primary emphasis for the MSDF is anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The current inventory of ASW assets include 50 ships, 130 land-based patrol aircraft, 60 helicopters and 14 submarines.¹⁵⁸ The surface ships have hull sonars that are on a par with comparable U.S. variants. The second ship of the Shirane-class has the U.S.-built passive-towed

¹⁵⁶Ibid., p. 284.

¹⁵⁷Department of Defense, Soviet, p. 103.

¹⁵⁸International Institute, Balance, p. 101.

hydrophone array (TASS). The TASS gives any surface ship tremendous additional anti-submarine warfare capability and is definitely a step in the right direction.

In their submarines, the Japanese have 14 of the best weapons available to counter the Soviet submarine threat. The problem is that none of the Japanese submarines are nuclear-, but rather diesel electric-powered. While these submarines can be used for defense of the coastal waters and deployed into choke points like Tsushima, Tsugaru, and the Soya Straits, they cannot be used for anti-submarine operations in an open-ocean environment. This is important even to a coastal navy, because it means that once fired on, the enemy cannot be pursued into open ocean to continue the engagement. The enemy nuclear attack submarine can then reposition in its own good time to neutralize the conventionally-powered diesel electric submarine.

The most limiting factor preventing the Japanese from having a truly effective ASW force, is their lack of a state-of-the-art homing torpedo. The MSDF still uses the MK-44 torpedo. This weapon does not offer the guidance and homing sophistication, nor the warhead size required to contact and destroy Soviet nuclear-powered submarines. This problem is being corrected by introduction of the MK-46 torpedo into the Japanese inventory. A definite step in the right direction, the MK-46 is a vastly superior weapon. Yet, the Japanese plan is to slowly, incrementally replace their aging fleet of MK-44's, leaving them vulnerable in ASW defense for years to come.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁹Moore, Jane's Ships 1984-85, pp. 282-283.

D. CURRENT JAPANESE MARITIME DEFENSE POLICY

Japan's appreciation for the role of the MSDF increased in the early 1970's. The Arab oil embargo, the Nixon policy of a reduced U.S. military presence in the Pacific, the Nixon "Shocks," and the revaluation of the U.S. dollar, began to shake Japan from the deep sleep of post-war complacency. Some Japanese realized, perhaps for the first time since World War II, that the U.S. could not be the Alpha and Omega of maritime protection and economic stability for Japan.¹⁶⁰ It was clear that if the U.S. had to choose between its own interests and Japan's, it would choose its own. Japan did likewise, and opposed the U.S. stand on Israel in favor of Arab oil. What is interesting is that Japan did not significantly increase the MSDF to compensate for diminishing U.S. power.

Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki expanded Japan's defense to include defense of sea-lanes to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles during his meetings on May 7 and 8, 1981, with President Reagan.¹⁶¹ Little future action was taken on this policy, because Prime Minister Suzuki was in political trouble at home for having made this extraordinary promise.¹⁶² In March of 1982, Secretary of Defense Weinberger reminded Suzuki of his 1,000 mile defense

¹⁶⁰ Nobuhiko Ushiba, Graham Allison and Thierry de Montbrial, "Why Japan Does Not Do More Globally," Christian Science Monitor, 1 March 1983, p. 23.

¹⁶¹ Steven R. Weisman, "Japanese Premier Vows 'Even Greater Efforts' on Defense," New York Times, 9 May 1981, p. 7.

¹⁶² "Tokyo Newspapers Greet Suzuki With Cool Response to U.S. Trip," New York Times, 11 May, 1981, p. A11.

¹⁶³ Richard Halloran, "Weinberger Asks Japanese to Rearm," New York Times, 26 March 1982, p. A3.

promise,¹⁶³ which prompted the Prime Minister to propose a joint Japanese-U.S. study of sea-lanes defense. The joint study began meeting in March, 1983, and is yet to conclude.¹⁶⁴

Prime Minister Nakasone, who took office in November, 1982, reaffirmed the commitment made by his predecessor to defend the sea-lanes out to 1000 nautical miles. In an interview following a January 18, 1983, meeting with President Reagan, Nakasone stated three important defense objectives. First, that Japan is "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" for use against Soviet bombers. Second, that Japan should have "complete and full control" of the straits through the Japan islands. Third, that Japan must "secure and maintain ocean lines of communication" to "several hundred miles." "Our desire would be to defend the sea-lanes between Guam and Tokyo and between the Strait of Arisan and Osaka."¹⁶⁵

Prime Minister Nakasone affirmed the principle of the 1000 mile protection zone again during meetings with President Reagan in November, 1983. At a press conference that followed this meeting, Prime Minister Nakasone stated, "I wish to continue to make further efforts along the lines of the joint communique of May, 1981."¹⁶⁶

While these affirmations from the Prime Minister of Japan, appear to convey widespread support for Japan to accept a large share of its own regional security responsibilities, this appearance is a mirage. First, Prime Minister Nakasone is the exception rather than the rule as a Japanese Prime Minister. He is a dynamic, strong leader;

¹⁶⁴Bouchard and Hess, "Sea-Lanes Defense," p. 90.

¹⁶⁵"Because of Expansion (We Risk) Being Isolated," Washington Post, 19 January 1983, p. A12.

¹⁶⁶Quoted in Bouchard and Hess, "Sea-Lanes Defense," p. 91.

quite conservative, and in favor of a prudent, strong defense. In short, he does not necessarily reflect the views of most Japanese people.¹⁶⁷

Second, the specter of World War II still pervades Japan. Many Japanese still fear that rearmament could bring with it the chance for a recurrence of the events that brought atomic destruction to the homeland. Nothing, they feel, is worth that. Complete rearmament should, therefore, never be considered.¹⁶⁸

Third, many pragmatic Japanese recognize that they have a "good deal" in the mutual security treaty. With the U.S. guarantee of protection, Japan is able to meet all of her security requirements by spending less than one percent of Japan's Gross National Product (GNP). A better deal would be hard to find.¹⁶⁹

There are some faintly encouraging signs that Japan is moving to accept a bigger share of their defense responsibilities. While Prime Minister Nakasone has been criticized in Japan for his "hawkish" stand on defense, he was re-elected in November, of 1984, as president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and, therefore, by custom, as Prime Minister.

Separately, the MSDF has been gradually increasing its participation in RIMPAC exercises and other less-visible U.S.-MSDF joint training endeavors.¹⁷⁰ While there is still some controversy, joint U.S.-JMSDF participation is gaining

¹⁶⁷Geoffrey Murray, "Nakasone's US Visit Heightens His Hawkish Image in Japan," Christian Science Monitor, 21 January 1983, p. 4.

¹⁶⁸Clyde Haberman, "Japanese Celebrate, Sort of, a Patriotic Day Today," New York Times, 11 February 1984, p. 2.

¹⁶⁹Walter Taylor with Hidehiro Tanakadate, "When Push Comes to Shove With Japan," U.S. News and World Report, 27 June 1983, pp. 35-36.

¹⁷⁰Japan Defense Agency, Defensé, pp. 179-182.

more support. These training opportunities must be carefully chosen to ensure that the bounds of "self-defense" are not overstepped to become "offensive." Joint protection of commercial shipping within 1000 nautical miles of Japan is fine, but screening a U.S. carrier battle group in the same area is perhaps not. The very fact that Japan can engage in these RIMPAC exercises suggests a huge step forward in broadening MSDF horizons.¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹Ibid., p. 179.

VIII. FUTURE ROK NAVY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

The ROK Navy has authorized construction of the following: 1 patrol submarine; 1 2000-ton Frigate, probably similar to the existing Ulsan class; 3 1600-ton Frigates; 3 1000-ton corvettes; and 3 500-ton corvettes. These ships will be built by Hyundai or Tacoma-Korea manufacturing corporations, and will improve the fighting capability of the ROK Navy.¹⁷²

Korea's emergence as a shipbuilding country is dramatic. In 1974, South Korea was ranked 17th in the world in ship building orders. By the end of 1981, it was second only to Japan, with an installed capacity of 4 million gross tonnage a year.¹⁷³ With modern shipyards and dedicated shipyard workers, whose wages are 65 percent lower than Japanese workers', the Republic of Korea has a distinct advantage. The ROK builds comparable ships, priced about 15 percent lower than Japan and 20 to 35 percent lower than Europe's.¹⁷⁴ With this significant ship building capacity and highly competitive prices, the ROK could quickly increase the size and quality of the ROK Navy.

There is, however, no indication that a dramatic increase in the size of the ROK Navy will occur. Why is this? For one, the most likely threat to South Korean security comes for the North Korean Army and Air Force, not the North Korean Navy. As discussed in Chapter 4 and Appendix C, the North's Army and Air Force have impressive

¹⁷²Moore, Jane's Ships 1984-85, pp. 310-317.

¹⁷³Jacqueline Reditt, "South Korea Surges Forth as Shipbuilding Power," Christian Science Monitor, 5 April 1983, p. 11.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. 11.

numbers of equipment.¹⁷⁵ If the DPRK Army and Air Force conducted a successful surprise attack on South Korean defenses, the results could be disastrous for the security of the ROK. If the DPRK Navy conducted a similarly successful attack against ROK ports, the short-term damage would not be as grave. ROK defense spending is, therefore, dedicated to support a significant army and air force and a much less significant Navy.

Another issue that limits ROK defense spending on the Navy, is the ROK Army's dominant influence within the South Korean government. The last two Presidents of South Korea, Park Chung Hee, and Chun Doo Hwan ascended to the Presidency through military coups. In both cases these coups were initiated by ROK Army officers who considered them vital to national well-being.¹⁷⁶ The Army, therefore, has a self-imposed "savior from destruction,"¹⁷⁷ image that ensures, among other things, that no other ROK military branch will ever hold as much military or political clout as they.

This is not to say that in order to protect the sea-lanes of communication vital to the economy, the ROK could not justify enlarging their navy.¹⁷⁸ Pressure from the U.S., including a demand to share in sea lanes of communication (SLOC) protection¹⁷⁹ to compensate for the \$3 billion trade imbalance favoring the ROK,¹⁸⁰ or to reciprocate for U.S.

¹⁷⁵International Institute, Balance, pp. 102-103.

¹⁷⁶Henderson, Vortex, p. 357. and "Politics and Social Affairs," Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook, 1981, p. 176.

¹⁷⁷Henderson, Vortex, p. 357.

¹⁷⁸Urban C. Lehner, "What Put South Korea on the Fast Track?" Christian Science Monitor, 3 May 1982, p. 31.

¹⁷⁹Edward A. Olsen, "Why Not Let South Korea Help?" Christian Science Monitor, 2 June 1983, p. 23.

¹⁸⁰Henry Eason, "Trading Views: Korea and the United States," Nation's Business, December, 1984, p. 50.

forces stationed in South Korea could cause the ROK to expand their navy. In the absence of U.S. demands or other external factors, the ROK Navy will probably remain small.

IX. THE MSDF BUILD-UP

The 1976 National Defense Program Outline planned for the MSDF to reach the goal of 60 ASW ships, 16 submarines, 2 minesweeping flotillas, 16 land-based ASW squadrons (10 fixed wing, 6 helicopter squadrons) and a total of 220 aircraft of all types, by an unspecified date.¹⁸¹ This target is currently 10 ASW ships, 2 submarines and 30 aircraft short of the mark.¹⁸²

The 1982 Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate, the "56 Chugyo," covering the years 1983-1987, calls for the following force structure improvements: construction or purchase of 14 destroyers, 6 submarines, 13 minesweepers, 6 missile boats, 10 auxiliary ships, 50 P-3C ASW patrol planes, 61 HSS-2 and 2 SH-60B ASW helicopters.¹⁸³ This level of procurement is generally impressive, however, defense spending in 1983 and 1984 was not sufficient to achieve these targets by the year 1987.

The total number of new equipment planned for in the 1982 Mid-Term Defense Program is not significant enough to dramatically increase the MSDF's overall size or capability. The program provides for improvement in the quality of the equipment in position and replacement of antiquated items. This new equipment, including some of the best U.S. devices, will maximize the capabilities of the limited number of units the Japanese are willing to fund, and should improve the defensive capability of the MSDF.

¹⁸¹ Japan Defense Agency, Defense, pp. 270-275.

¹⁸² International Institute, Balance, p. 101.

¹⁸³ Japan Defense Agency, Defense, pp. 257-263.

In crucial warfare areas, the JMSDF is procuring some of the most sophisticated U.S. systems available for foreign military sales. As mentioned, the JMSDF is strengthening anti-air warfare capability with the installation of CWIS, and chaff launchers, on all-new combatants, while new guided missile destroyers are receiving the advanced SM-1-MR surface-to-air missile.¹⁸⁴

Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is also being improved. Current ASW programs will enhance the JMSDF capability in that area, including deployment of the AN/SQR-18A tactical towed array passive sonar on helicopter-carrying destroyers, licensed production in Japan of the Lockheed P-3C Update II ASW patrol aircraft and the MK-46 Modification 5 ASW torpedo, and procurement of two SH-60B helicopters in preparation for their production in Japan.¹⁸⁵

In other warfare areas, installation of the Harpoon anti-ship missile on new MSDF ships, P3-C patrol aircraft and submarines is an important step toward an effective anti-surface warfare capability. In mine warfare, current plans include building new ships, equipping them with modern mine-hunting systems, and adding new airborne mine counter-measures helicopters, as well.¹⁸⁶

This progress is positive, but it's not enough. Prime Minister Nakasone has gone on record to protect sea lanes to 1,000 miles and, should war break out, to bottle up the Soviet fleet in the Sea of Japan.¹⁸⁷ To accomplish this, some Reagan Administration officials have said privately that Japan would have to increase military spending 10 to 12

¹⁸⁴R. T. Pretty, ed. Jane's Weapon Systems 1977, 8th ed. (New York: Jane's Yearbooks, Franklin Watts, 1976) p. 149.

¹⁸⁵Bouchard and Hess, "Sea-Lanes Defense," p. 94.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., p. 94.

¹⁸⁷Clyde Haberman, "Japan Steps Up Talk of Arms and World Role," New York Times, 17 August 1983, pp. 1 and 4.

percent a year.¹⁸⁸ Australian, T. B. Millar considers Japan must "increase the present Japanese navy by about a factor of three"¹⁸⁹ This is in contrast to the 6.55 percent increase in the Japanese military budget in 1984.¹⁹⁰ to meet their stated commitments.

It's debateable how much the JMSDF must grow to meet the 1,000 mile sea lane patrol commitment. It is clear, however, that the JMSDF needs more ships than it currently has to do the job. As U.S. pressure mounts to spend more on defense, the JMSDF will likely explore new methods of responding to that pressure.

¹⁸⁸New York Times, 26 January 1984, p. 1.

¹⁸⁹T. B. Millar, "Australia and the Security of the Pacific Basin," in "National Security Interest in the Pacific Basin," ed. Claude A. Buss, Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 249. (Xeroxed)

¹⁹⁰Ibid., p. 249.

X. ROK NAVY AND JMSDF COMPARED

Both the modern ROK Navy and JMSDF began with American-built equipment, and subsequently decided to design and build their own ships. Both navies still rely most heavily on U.S. weapons systems for their major source of firepower. Both utilize U.S. Navy procedures for operations and U.S. designed training programs. Both have destroyers and frigates as their capital ships, no aircraft carriers, and naval aviation arms for ASW only. Both have Harpoon missiles, 5-inch guns and MK-44 torpedoes, all U.S. weapons. Neither has nuclear weapons.

There are also dissimilarities between the two organizations. Japan has relatively modern ships, all built in the late 60's and 70's. With the exception of one new destroyer, the ROK has World War II vintage destroyers and frigates. The ROK has perhaps only one non-nuclear submarine, while the MSDF has 14 non-nuclear powered submarines.¹⁹¹ Japan has almost no amphibious capability, while the ROK troop lift, landing and extraction of forces capabilities are significant for a navy its size.¹⁹² The ROK recognizes the value of and practises amphibious assault, while Japan does not. Both navies are professional; the ROK Navy has an urgency about it born from their well-placed mistrust of the DPRK. This drive sharpens the readiness of the ROK Navy, making it slightly more professional.

Perhaps the greatest difference between the two navies, is their dissimilar primary missions. The ROK Navy is primarily a coastal defense Navy designed to defend against

¹⁹¹ Moore, Jane's Ships 1984-85, p. 311.

¹⁹² International Institute, Balance, p. 101.

the possibility of an attack or infiltration by the DPRK. Its focus is centered on stopping or neutralizing small, high speed craft and diesel-powered submarines from penetrating ROK Navy defenses.

The JMSDF has coastal defense concerns, but is primarily concerned with protecting the sea-lanes out to 1,000 miles and, in the event of war, blockading the Soviet fleet in the Sea of Japan.¹⁹³ These assignments are vast, and require more ships and manpower than the Japanese are willing to devote to them.

Differences aside, the ROK Navy and the JMSDF are compatible enough in important areas to make the mechanics of naval cooperation possible. With common U.S.-manufactured weapons systems, the two navies can understand the warfare capabilities of the other. Since both work separately with the U.S. in Team Spirit or RIMPAC exercises, both are required to communicate in the English language. A common language facilitates coordination and exercise conduct. Since both navies use tactical procedures familiar to the U.S., both the ROK Navy and JMSDF could cooperate without learning new tactical procedures.

No dissimilarity mentioned in this section is so serious as to preclude future ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. In fact, prevailing similarities between the ROK Navy and JMSDF support such cooperation.

¹⁹³Haberman, "Talk of Arms," New York Times, pp. 1 and 4.

XI. COOPERATION--IS IT POSSIBLE?

Is future cooperation between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF possible? Perhaps, but some significant hurdles must first be overcome. First, there is the age-old animosity between Korea and Japan. Koreans believe that they predated the Japanese, while some Japanese believe the opposite. Recent archaeological finds support Korea's position.¹⁹⁴ Since the Japanese believe that they were created by the gods as a special race of people, like no other, they view the Koreans as inferior, ill-bred and ill-mannered people. Conversely, the Koreans view the Japanese as arrogant, pushy and boorish.

At no time were these ill feelings as pronounced as during the Japanese occupation of Korea, from 1910-1945. Shortly after that annexation, Japan reduced the Korean Emperor to the title of "King"; Korea's name was changed from Taehan (Daikan) to the old name of Choson (Chosen); all treaties between Korea and other nations were void¹⁹⁵ the official language of Korea became Japanese; and Shinto was promoted as the preferred religion.¹⁹⁶

The Japanese wanted to improve the quality of Korean life, and did raise the standard of living somewhat. However, Korea was reshaped to serve Japan's needs. Korea became Japan's "rice bowl," and its industrial sector was built up to support Japan's requirements.¹⁹⁷ The Japanese

¹⁹⁴Reischauer, Japanese, p. 35.

¹⁹⁵Han, Korea, p. 465.

¹⁹⁶Kyung Cho Chung, Korea: The Third Republic, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1971), p. 15.

¹⁹⁷Kwa Bong Kim, The Korean-Japan Treaty Crisis (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 10.

controlled industry, transportation and communication, dominating the economic life of Korea.¹⁹⁸ As described by Woo-keun Han, "The Korean people were completely excluded from their own economy, which now became simply a source of profits and supplies for Japan."¹⁹⁹

The Japanese also dominated Korea politically. They established a pyramidal system of government with a Japanese Governor-General (a military officer of Flag or General rank) positioned at the top.²⁰⁰ Some Koreans were appointed to governmental positions, yet, the Japanese retained control. A tight security rein was maintained over the political scene by the use of Japanese secret police.²⁰¹ Kyung Cho Chung describes the period this way: "Consequently, Japan dominated not only the political but also the economic life of the Korean people. Japanese occupation witnessed the transformation of Korea into a Japanese colony."²⁰²

Korean animosity toward the Japanese continued after World War II. Unfortunately, liberating American forces in the South initially used Japanese personnel as the only experienced government officials available to run the Korean government. This seemed appropriate at the time, but incensed the Koreans who wondered what "liberation" really meant. The Japanese officials were soon replaced, but the damage was done.²⁰³

¹⁹⁸Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 90.

¹⁹⁹Han, Korea, p. 470.

²⁰⁰Lee, Korean Nationalism, p. 90.

²⁰¹Se-Jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Durham, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), p.6.

²⁰²Chung, Third Republic, p. 16.

²⁰³Kim, Military Revolution, p. 9.

In recent years, the enmity between Japan and South Korea continued, but with a few bright spots. Diplomatic relations were restored in 1965, with the signing of the Japanese-Korean Normalization Treaty.²⁰⁴ Japanese Prime Minister Sato promoted a closer relationship between the Republic of Korea and Japan and declared in 1969, "The security of the Republic of Korea is essential to Japan's own security."²⁰⁵

The Tanaka government that followed Sato distanced Japan from the Republic of Korea by attempting to achieve closer ties with Pyongyang and Beijing. In the summer of 1974, Tanaka's Foreign Minister, Kimura Toshio, stated, "The ROK government is not the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula." He further stated, "There is no threat from North Korea against South Korea," and not "the peace and security of South Korea," but, "the peace and security of the entire Korean peninsula is vital to Japan's own security."²⁰⁶ The ROK reaction to this was one of growing concern over this new Japanese acceptance of the DPRK.

In August, 1973, ROK dissident leader Kim Dae-Jung was kidnapped in Tokyo by a group widely suspected to be agents of the South Korean government. This strained ROK - Japan relations significantly.²⁰⁷ Tokyo - Seoul relations took a turn for the worse, in 1974, when two Japanese youths were arrested and tried for an attempted overthrow of the South Korean government.²⁰⁸ The situation almost exploded with the August 15, 1974, assassination attempt on South Korean

²⁰⁴ Clyde and Beers, Far East, p. 484.

²⁰⁵ Hong N. Kim, "Japan's Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula Since 1965," in The Two Koreas in World Politics, eds. Tae-Hwan Kwak, Wayne Patterson and Edward A. Olsen (Seoul, Korea: Kyungnam University Press, 1983), p. 305.

²⁰⁶ Quoted in Kim, "Japan's Policy," p. 308.

²⁰⁷ Buss, Background for Policy, p. 109.

²⁰⁸ Kim, "Japan's Policy," p. 309.

President Park, in which his wife was killed. The assassin was Moon Se Kwang, a Korean resident of Japan. The Seoul government demanded an apology from Japan, but none was forthcoming.²⁰⁹ The inauguration of the Miki government in December, 1974, "normalized" Japan - ROK relations following the friction created by events during Tanaka's government.²¹⁰

The next Japanese government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, came under fire in 1977. Many South Koreans believed that Prime Minister Fukuda knuckled under to the United States when Japan failed to openly criticize President Carter's planned U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea.²¹¹ The Carter troop withdrawal proposal created a crisis of confidence in ROK - U.S. - Japan relations. The South Koreans, understandably, felt betrayed and the Japanese were upset about not being consulted prior to the announcement of the withdrawal plans. The Japanese feared that the withdrawal would be regionally destabilizing and could trigger an expanded North-South Korea arms race. In response to this concern Prime Minister Fukuda traveled to Washington to meet with President Carter. Though he did not openly criticize the President, Prime Minister Fukuda did receive Carter's assurance that no withdrawal would occur before consultation between U.S. - ROK - Japanese officials could ensure peace was maintained on the peninsula.²¹² Thus, the ROK concern of Japan knuckling under to U.S. pressure was probably not a valid one; but it was a perception.

²⁰⁹Clyde and Beers, Far East, p. 485.

²¹⁰Buss, Background for Policy, pp. 109-110.

²¹¹Kim, "Japan's Policy," p. 312.

²¹²Buss, Background for Policy, pp. 110-111.

In July, 1979, President Carter announced he would suspend his South Korean troop withdrawal plan. This decision met with approval by the ROK and the Ohira administration in Tokyo, which replaced the Fukuda government.²¹³

To further military cooperation and forestall future U.S. troop withdrawal attempts, the Director-General of the Japanese Defense Agency, Yamashita Ganri, visited Seoul to confer with South Korean Defense Minister Ro Jae-Hyun. During these talks, agreement was made to increase the number of visits between military officials of the two countries and allow ROK Naval units to call at Japanese ports.²¹⁴

The assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979, and the tough clamp down on Korean dissidents by Park's successor, President Chun Doo Hwan, again soured ROK - Japan relations. ROK dissident leader Kim Dae Jung's death sentence for sedition exacerbated memories of Kim's kidnapping. This was such a sensitive issue that it promised to short-circuit all earlier goodwill gestures between the two countries. President Chun's decision to commute Kim's sentence was a big step in the right direction to get ROK - Japanese relations back on track.²¹⁵

In July, 1982, Japanese - ROK relations once more took a turn for the worse when the South Korean news media reported that Japan had revised its school textbooks to gloss over its colonization period of Korea from 1910 - 1945. The South Korean public was furious and demanded a retraction. The issue was settled, when South Korea accepted Japan's promise to revise the disputed textbooks within two years by

²¹³Kim, "Japan's Policy," p. 313.

²¹⁴Ibid., p. 313.

²¹⁵Jacqueline Reditt, "South Korea President Chun's 3-Year-Old Rule Settles in to a Limited Democracy," Christian Science Monitor, 28 April 1983, pp. 12-13.

using new guidelines to be established by the Education Ministry.²¹⁶

In November, 1982, Prime Minister Nakasone was elected to his first term as Japan's Prime Minister and shortly thereafter scheduled a visit to the Republic of Korea.²¹⁷ During the visit, President Chun accepted the Japanese offer of \$4 billion in a public loan, thus settling a nagging dispute between the two countries.²¹⁸

This dispute centered around the amount of loan desired by the ROK, and the official justification for the loan. Discussions began in the summer of 1981 when the ROK requested \$6 billion for their significant effort and contribution to the security of Japan. South Korea's trade deficit was also mentioned. The implication was that the ROK was paying Japan's regional security bills and had to factor that additional cost into their own trade.²¹⁹

Tokyo did not agree with the amount, nor the purpose of the loan, so talks became stalled and unpleasant. Prime Minister Nakasone and President Chun realized that a compromise on this issue would be beneficial to both nations and be a mutually positive political move, as well. They agreed on a \$4 billion loan consisting of \$1.85 billion at concessional interest rates and \$2.15 billion as

²¹⁶Geoffrey Murray, "Japan's Junior High Schoolers Learn (Again) of Their Nation's Militarism," Christian Science Monitor, 7 June 1983, p. 9.

²¹⁷Takashi Oka, "Japanese Premier to Patch Up Korean Ties Before US Trip," Christian Science Monitor, 7 January 1983, p. 8.

²¹⁸Takashi Oka, "Japan's Nakasone Explores Common Ground With Korea," Christian Science Monitor, 13 January 1983, p. 5.

²¹⁹"Japan Government Plans to Grant Aid to South Koreans," Wall Street Journal, 13 January 1983, p. 34.

export-import bank loans at higher rates. The purpose of the loan was not declared, thereby diffusing the security and trade deficit issues.²²⁰

Following the Seoul summit of January 11-12, 1983, a joint communique was issued that concentrated on the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula as crucial to Japan's security. It also praised the ROK peace overtures to the DPRK and set up a "Hotline" between Seoul and Tokyo to aid in potential disputes of the future. This was the first visit of a Japanese Prime Minister to South Korea since 1965.²²¹

Perhaps an even more historic and important event occurred in September, 1984, when President Chun Doo Hwan visited Japan, as the only Korean President to make an official call on a Japanese Emperor. This event was like a healing balm for ROK - Japanese relations. In preparation for the visit, the Japanese put on a pro-Republic of Korea public information blitz.²²² The visit, which went extremely well, was highlighted by Emperor Hirohito's toast:

...Our two countries were thus bound by deep neighborly relations over the ages.

In spite of such relations, however, it is indeed regrettable that there was an unfortunate past between us for a period in this century, and I believe that it should not be repeated again.

Today, I am deeply gratified that friendship and good will between our two countries are going to be increasingly deepened for the future and an age of shared prosperity is dawning upon them, thanks to their efforts and cooperation...²²³

²²⁰Oka, "Japan's Nakasone," p. 5.

²²¹Oka, "Japanese Premier," p. 8.

²²²Comments of Professor Edward A. Olsen based on his observations in Japan during Chun's visit, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 24 September 1984.

²²³"Emperor's Remarks to Chun on Korea Ties" New York Times, 7 September 1983, p. 9.

More than any event, this visit healed the wounds of the past and gave hope for the future. Yet, what does this mean to potential future cooperation between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF? Simply stated, cooperation in 1945 was impossible. Cooperation in 1985 is, given the proper encouragement and the right circumstances, quite possible. To support this claim of possible cooperation between the JMSDF and the ROK Navy, we must examine the other questions posed by this thesis, namely, How? When? What form? What responsibilities? Is it in our best interest? Asia's best interest? Who would favor it? Who would not?

A. ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATION

There are several important reasons why ROK Navy and JMSDF cooperation would be in the best interest of both countries. The first is that it would be cost-effective from a defense expenditure standpoint. By coordinating their effects in a specific geographic area of protection, each nation would be able to use their existing fleets to bring about a higher degree of security, without spending a great deal more on defense.

This is important to both nations, but perhaps more so to Japan, which is under heavy U.S. pressure to increase military spending and assume more defense responsibility in the Far East. This issue is so sensitive to the Japanese people that Prime Minister Nakasone was required to promise the one percent limit on defense spending would not be violated in 1984, prior to his acceptance by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as its Presidential candidate.^{2 2 4}

^{2 2 4} "Nakasone Renews Pledge on Defense Spending Limit," FBIS, Daily Report, East Asia and Pacific, 13 May 1983, p. C3.

Some U.S. Congressional officials continue to be dissatisfied with Japan's security contribution and agree with former Commander and Chief U.S. Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Robert Long, when he states: "I continue to strongly urge them (Japan) to increase their defense budget--not for offensive capacity, but strictly for the defense of Japan."²²⁵ Washington wants Tokyo to push for some tangible goals in terms of numbers of ships and aircraft. As a minimum, the U.S. wants to see Japan with at least 350 modern interceptor fighters, 70 destroyers and frigates, 25 submarines and 125 modern antisubmarine warfare patrol aircraft before the end of this decade.²²⁶

Tokyo's latest defense plan for 1983-1987 falls short of this U.S. goal and calls for 140-155 fighters, 60 destroyers and 72 antisubmarine patrol aircraft.²²⁷ Current annual defense spending is not reaching a level to support even this build-up.²²⁸

A cooperative effort between the ROK Navy and JMSDF could enhance the flexibility of the naval forces that each nation already has, and give them increased defense capability for no more money. How could the ROK and Japan get something for nothing? By cooperating, the total number of combined units would be as follows: 69 destroyers and frigates, 14 submarines (all Japanese), 482 fighter aircraft (F-15, F-4, F-5), and 89 antisubmarine warfare aircraft (P-3, S-2, P-2).²²⁹

²²⁵Takashi Oka, "US Admiral Urges Japan To Increase Its Defense Budget," Christian Science Monitor, 24 June 1983, p. 6.

²²⁶Geoffrey Murray, "Rearming Japan: Nakasone's Policies Renew Old Debate," Christian Science Monitor, 4 April 1983, pp. 12-13.

²²⁷Ibid., pp. 12-13.

²²⁸Japan Defense Agency, Defense, pp. 268-269.

²²⁹International Institute, Balance, pp. 101 and 103.

The tactical value of these larger numbers would be flexibility; flexibility to respond to provocation from the DPRK, from Soviet pressure in the Kuriles, or from a blockade of the straits. If properly trained, these naval forces could be as effective as forces from a single country. Thus, from a dollar cost standpoint, cooperation would strongly benefit both the ROK and Japan.

A second important reason for the ROK and Japan to establish this cooperation is that it would help meet goals set by the United States. As already mentioned, the Republic of Korea and Japan have proportionally large trade surpluses with the United States. For the first time in 71 years, the U.S. is approaching the status of a net debtor nation, with a \$101.6 billion deficit in 1984.²³⁰ No one would entirely blame either the ROK or Japan for the U.S. trade problems. A strong dollar abroad, coupled with some U.S. inefficiency and just plain mistakes, have spelled problems for U.S. exporters. However, these disturbing trade statistics will cause the U.S. to look harder for ways to save money, putting more pressure on the ROK and Japan to assume a larger share of the U.S. defense burden. A joint ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation agreement would please the U.S. and, thus, help to lessen this pressure.

A third benefit for ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation would be a strengthening of the developing relationship between the two nations. As discussed, the relationship between these two culturally linked nations has often been stormy, yet is currently on the upswing. This cooperation would be an additional positive step towards understanding and friendship.

²³⁰ "Record U.S. Trade Deficit in 84; Factor Use Falls," A.P. Wire service Report in the Monterey Peninsula Herald, 19 March 1985, p. 13.

Cooperation could extend to better economic and political relations. South Korea, which experienced a \$23 billion trade deficit with Japan between 1965 and 1982²³¹ is interested in narrowing that margin with broader access to the Japanese market. Another issue which the two countries have discussed, but not solved, is the legal status of Korean residents in Japan. There are about 670,000 Koreans living in Japan. Many of them were born in Japan, speak Japanese, have lived there throughout their lives, but are still considered foreigners. They are therefore, not entitled to Japanese social welfare programs and must be fingerprinted when registering with local authorities. Even Japanese criminal suspects are not fingerprinted unless a warrant for their arrest is issued.²³²

There is also the issue of Japanese economic "aid" to the ROK, which South Korea considers payment for their high levels of military spending which tangentially ensures Japan's security. The Japanese, on the other hand, officially consider this as bonafide economic aid to a developing neighbor.

These civil issues could incidentally benefit from defense cooperation. As defense cooperation progressed, it is possible that these non-defense matters could enjoy a "coat-tail" effect. The more mutual defense-related contact between Japanese and South Koreans as equals, the harder it will be to maintain animosity between the two nations on civil issues.

Japan is concerned about economic competition from an emerging "new Japan" in the Republic of Korea. During former President Park's regime, ROK exports increased on the average of 42 percent annually, stimulating a 10 percent

²³¹Kim, "Japan's Policy," p. 318.

²³²Clyde Haberman, "An American Alien in Japan Feels 'Like a Criminal'," New York Times, 21 July 1983, p. A2.

average annual growth rate in GNP.²³³ In the 1970's, South Korea became the fastest-growing economy in the non-OPEC Third World. By the end of the Park regime, South Korean exports amounted to 5 percent of the U.S. imports and 3 percent of Japan's, from virtually none a decade before.²³⁴

Today, Korea's growth continues to exceed expectations. Real GNP grew 9.6 percent in the first quarter of 1983, and the projection for GNP growth in 1984 is 8.1 per cent.²³⁵ This growth in GNP has been aided significantly by a 50 percent increase in domestic construction (some in preparation for the 1988 Olympics) and a real growth of 7 percent in exports.²³⁶

If the Seoul Olympics are smoothly executed, and the ROK will do everything to ensure that they are, South Korea will get more worldwide positive media exposure than it ever has. This exposure will likely be exploited favorably by the ROK to do things like encourage foreign investment and, perhaps use Madison Avenue techniques to sell Hyundai cars. As Time magazine proclaims:

World auto makers do not rank among big league players until they sell their cars in the U.S., the world's richest auto showroom. Last week South Korea announced its bid for a place in that market. Executives of Hyundai Motor America, a subsidiary of South Korea's largest industrial conglomerate (est. 1984, sales: \$10.3 billion), said that they will begin selling cars in the U.S. this fall.²³⁷

²³³ Olsen, "Korea, Inc.," p. 42.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 45.

²³⁵ U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States, FET-84-13 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, March, 1984), p. 4.

²³⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

²³⁷ "Korean Chrome Heads for the U.S.," Time, February 11, 1985, p. 72.

As a warm-up to the American market, Hyundai sold its subcompact cars last year in Canada. Hoping to initially sell 5,000 cars, Hyundai's pony car sales topped 25,000, or 11 percent of the Canadian import market, largely because of their \$4,600 base price.²³⁸ This concerns Japanese car makers, who understand from their own successes how lucrative the inexpensive car market in the U.S. can be.

Japan is concerned that their lead in inexpensively-produced, quality-manufactured goods could evaporate in the hands of cheaper South Korean labor competition. As Michio Mizoguchi, a top Foreign Ministry official puts it when he talks about foreign economic competition, "China is running. Korea is running. Singapore is running. India is running."²³⁹ Japan does not want to be beaten.

Military cooperation and mutual security could facilitate greater ROK - Japan economic cooperation, as well. Japan could benefit the ROK by sharing its U.S. marketing skill, while the ROK could allow Japan to invest and share in the profits as the South Korean economy expands.

A fourth reason that Japan and the Republic of Korea would benefit from cooperation between their navies is that each would increase their national security. No where is this more viable than on the Korean peninsula. The DPRK is equipped with 21 submarines, 4 frigates, and some 418 smaller, yet capable patrol craft; some with missiles, some without.²⁴⁰ The commitment of the MSDF to work with the ROK Navy to blunt its primary adversary would be welcome in Seoul.

²³⁸Ibid., p. 72.

²³⁹John S. Lang, "Samurai Spirit Lives On in Japan's Economic Drive," U.S. News and World Report, 19 November 1984, pp. 47-48.

²⁴⁰International Institute, Balance, p. 102.

In return, the ROK Navy could conduct joint operations in the Sea of Japan and assist in supporting Japan's promise to provide naval protection for commercial sea-lanes extending 1,000 nautical miles from Japan.²⁴¹ This sea-lane protection is crucial to the well-being of both Japan and the ROK. If the Soviets were able to deny the 'freedom of shipping lane transit to Japan and the ROK, their respective economies would be seriously damaged.²⁴² A joint ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation agreement to protect the maritime lines of communication to 1,000 miles from Japan, would be viewed favorably by Washington, and take some of the pressure off the U.S. Seventh Fleet.²⁴³

Finally, JMSDF and ROK Navy cooperation with U.S. blessing would bring more autonomy from U.S. security demands and a larger voice in the development of adequate regional security measures. This autonomy would advance prestige, which both Japan²⁴⁴ and the ROK secretly desire.²⁴⁵

From the United States' perspective, this increased autonomy could be a mixed blessing. On the positive side, greater autonomy brings with it greater responsibility. Seoul and Tokyo would have more say in what they should do

²⁴¹ "Text of Communique on Reagan-Suzuki Discussions," New York Times, 9 May 1981, p. 7.

²⁴² Claude A. Buss, ed. Introductory comments in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin." Hoover Institution, Stanford California, 1984, p. 98. (Xeroxed)

²⁴³ Daniel Southerland, "Mansfield: Crucial Year In US-Japan Ties," Christian Science Monitor, 10 February 1983, p. 3.

²⁴⁴ Nobuhiko Ushiba, Graham Allison, and Thierry de Montbrial, "Why Japan Does Not Do More Globally," Christian Science Monitor, 1 March 1983, p. 23.

²⁴⁵ Robert Keatley, "South Korea's President Seeks Acceptance Abroad," Wall Street Journal, 18 January 1982, p. 23.

for their own security, but they'd also have more to do. This could mean increased levels of military spending on their part to meet the challenge of this new responsibility.

On the negative side, increased ROK and Japanese defense spending might not be forthcoming. This is an important issue, for it is doubtful that the U.S. would embrace a plan that offered significantly less U.S. control with zero increase in ROK Navy/JMSDF ships. If the plan drastically curtails U.S. military influence in the region, then the U.S. would have to be assured that the ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation could effectively assume the defense burden. Future study beyond the scope of this thesis should be conducted to determine under what circumstances the U.S. would be willing to reduce military control in return for greater security contributions from Japan and Korea.

B. IF SO, WHEN?

If cooperation can take place, when can it be realized? Cooperation could come as early as the end of this decade. It could come as late as never. The key seems to be, what each country will tolerate politically and popularly.

As Lieutenant Colonel Yoshihisa Nakamura, of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force and professor of Defense Studies at the Japanese National Defense Academy said in an interview:

If the Navies were left to themselves, cooperation could begin almost immediately. Defacto low key cooperation is the key. Begin with officer exchange programs, then slowly increase with a low key port visit here, a small exercise there. If it was done this way...maybe cooperation in 5-6 years. If it is done officially with a high profile, it will take much more than 10 years before cooperation begins.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁶ Interview with Yoshihisa Nakamura, Lieutenant Colonel, Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force, Professor of Defense Studies at the Japanese National Defense Academy. Monterey, California, 22 January 1985.

To Colonel Nakamura, "low key" efforts are essential to the early success of any cooperation blueprint. Politically and operationally it is simpler to begin with small steps toward a larger goal. Public opinion in the ROK and Japan will be a significant factor determining how quickly to proceed, yet public opinion in these countries is influenced, in part, by governmental policy. While the "low key" approach is probably best to start, Seoul and Tokyo will have to assert their influence at some point if ROK - Japanese cooperation is to succeed.

C. WHAT FORM MIGHT THIS COOPERATION TAKE?

A good deal more water will have to pass under the bridge before either the ROK or Japan will be willing to permit any of their forces to be commanded by an officer from the other country. If cooperation depended on this, then it probably wouldn't happen. This is where the United States, and particularly the U.S. Navy, must play a key role.

The U.S. Navy is likely the only authority that both the ROK Navy and the JMSDF would permit their ships to serve under. There are at least two reasons for this: U.S. financial strength and U.S. regional security contribution. If the ROK and Japan would submit to any country's authority in joint operations, it would be the United States.

The United States could develop a plan that would permit these two to cooperate without requiring either of them to accept the supremacy of the other. This could be accomplished without increasing the size of U.S. staffs at all. For example, Commander Seventh Fleet could be charged with the additional responsibility of "Commander Naval Forces Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United States" or ComNavForJROKUS (pronounced Jay-rock-us). CNFJROKUS's

principal assistants could be the already existing Commander Naval Forces Japan (CNFJ) and Commander Naval Forces Korea (CNFK) and their host country counterparts.

When exercises involving the three countries were scheduled, each country could plan a portion of the exercise. This would permit the assignment of each participant as Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) for a particular event. Yet the Officer in overall Command of the entire Exercise (OCE) would continue to be the senior U.S. officer present.

These exercises could start small, but develop into significant events involving all phases of warfare operations, including ASW, AAW, ASUW, and amphibious landings. Port visits could be arranged, perhaps highlighting one country for each exercise. Basic United States Navy tactical procedures could be used to coordinate communications, tactical maneuvers, drills, etc.

The exercises could soon become as important, and exciting as NATO and RIMPAC exercises already are. With proper planning, They could improve professionalism and readiness in each of the navies and promote goodwill at the same time.

If an actual crisis occurred, Japan and the Republic of Korea could operate autonomously until the U.S. Navy arrived on the scene to assume overall command of the forces available. This inefficiency is bothersome, but necessary until such time as the Republic of Korea and Japan can operate without U.S. leadership.

To promote ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation without U.S. leadership, a time might come when the U.S. will want to explore rotating the overall command of exercises between the three nations. Before this can happen, the ROK and Japan will have to be willing to submit to the other's command during specific exercise periods. The U.S. will also have to place its designated exercise ships under ROK

Navy or JMSDF command during specified periods. The day is long away when each of the three nations will accept these command arrangements, but effective cooperation will eventually bring the questions of shared command to the fore.

The U.S. Navy plays a key role in cooperation between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF and must demonstrate leadership and enthusiasm. U.S. Navy liaison officers who will ride ROK and Japanese naval forces ships during exercises must be carefully selected to ensure professionalism, statesmanship, and a positive approach to events.

The U.S. Navy will have to initially adjust to standards of operation not commensurate with high U.S. training levels. However, the ROK and Japanese improvement will likely be dramatic in a short period of time. By the end of an exercise, each nation, including the United States, will be better able to operate as an effective team in defense of East Asia.

This new-found professionalism can only serve to gratify. The pride of the ROK Navy and the JMSDF will be conceived out of their knowledge that they can "run with the big boys." Serving to enhance this pride, the U.S. Navy must gradually give more responsibility in each exercise to the ROK and JMSDF to permit them to grow and flourish.

D. WHAT SECURITY BURDENS CAN BE SHARED?

This question is a difficult one because it requires a hard look at the sea lane areas near Japan and Korea, and an evaluation of what can reasonably be expected of the JMSDF and the ROK Navy. Figure 11.1 illustrates the Sea of Japan and the Tsushima, Shimonoseki, Soya and Tsugaru straits. One look at the location of the Soviets' important Naval bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk is all that is necessary to understand the immense strategic importance of the Sea of Japan and its straits of access.



Figure 11.1 Sea of Japan and Surrounding Straits

The Sea of Japan's water washes the shores of the USSR, DPRK, ROK and Japan, yet it has only three usable exits. They are the Tsushima Strait between the ROK and Japan, Tsugaru Strait between Hokkaido and Japan's main island of Honshu, and the Soya Strait between the Soviet island of Sakhalin and Japan's Hokkaido.

The Soviets' largest Naval base in the Far East is Vladivostok with about three-fourths of the USSR Far East fleet homeported there. While Vladivostok has a strong logistics network to support it, the ships homeported there are susceptible to wartime mining of the Straits. This could effectively prevent those ships from participating in an open ocean warfare scenario, because they would be unable to break free of the Sea of Japan.²⁴⁷

Petropavlovsk, on the other hand, is the home for the Soviets' most modern ballistic missile submarines, best attack submarines, and other surface ships capable of fighting the U.S. Seventh Fleet. While it is an ice-free port on the Pacific Ocean, it has virtually no supply infrastructure to support it, and must be supplied almost exclusively by the sea. Its greatest supplier of requirements is Vladivostok. In times of war, without the seaborne supply link from Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk would eventually become operationally emasculated, and of little use to ships that badly needed supplies.²⁴⁸

Vice Admiral Holcomb, USN (Ret.), former Commander U.S. Seventh Fleet maintains that the 24-mile stretch of water between the Soviet island of Sakhalin and Japan's Hokkaido is the "number one priority"²⁴⁹ for Soviet planners.

²⁴⁷Takashi Oka, "US, Soviet Naval Strategies in N. Pacific: Geography the Key," Christian Science Monitor, 3 May 1983, p. 3.

²⁴⁸Ibid., p. 3.

²⁴⁹Ibid., p. 3.

Without the ability to transit the Soya Strait, the Soviet Navy could be tactically disadvantaged in a wartime situation to the point of eventual failure.

Due to its location with respect to the Korean Peninsula, the Yellow Sea is also of significance. It is the primary operation area of the West Sea Fleet Command of the DPRK Navy, headquartered at Nampo.²⁵⁰ The Yellow Sea, whose waters wash the shores of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Korea, is vital to the security of South Korea. If North Korea's West Sea Fleet was able to deny the ROK passage of the Yellow Sea, the security of the whole of South Korea would be in question. As General MacArthur dramatically demonstrated by his daring and successful September 15, 1950, amphibious landing at Inchon,²⁵¹ the Yellow Sea must never fall completely into DPRK hands.

These two bodies of water, the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, their straits and the shipping lanes out to 1,000 miles from those straits, seem to be ideal for cooperation between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF. Using the command structure discussed in the previous section, the cooperating forces, under U.S. command could assume primary patrol responsibility for these assignments.

Included in this responsibility would be the assignment to prevent the USSR from deploying its naval forces from Vladivostok during a wartime scenario. This could require a combination of mining of the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya straits, coupled with anti-surface and anti-submarine patrols.²⁵²

²⁵⁰International Institute, Balance, p. 103.

²⁵¹Cagle and Manson, Sea War, p. 75.

²⁵²Takashi Oka, "US, Soviet Strategies," p. 3.

Whenever a United States aircraft carrier's power was required in either of these two seas, the JMSDF and ROK Navy could provide the ship escorts required for that U.S. carrier. These escorts would be subject to U.S. control and fulfill the role of U.S. cruisers, destroyers, and frigates in the discharge of their duties. This readjustment in ship assignment would free some U.S. Navy ships for other duties, such as sea lanes of communication protection, convoy duty, and anti-submarine warfare assignments.

There is one important area the U.S. must continue to solely control; nuclear weapons. The nuclear umbrella must be maintained by the U.S. and the U.S. alone. This could create some animosity because of the unique, destructive nature of this weaponry. Japan has a natural aversion to these weapons, for obvious reason. The recent decision by New Zealand's government to deny U.S. Navy ships permission to call in New Zealand ports²⁵³ could have far-reaching implications in Japan. New Zealand's response could lend support to Japan's versions of West Germany's Green Party, the anti-nuclear, environmental group. While Japan's version of the Green Party had only 500 members in 1983, this figure could grow if the New Zealand response is viewed with approval by the Japanese.²⁵⁴

To date, Japanese opponents of nuclear arms are utilizing a peaceful approach, as in the collection of 32 million signatures on a petition against the nuclear arms race.²⁵⁵ It is important to remind these anti-nuclear Japanese that the U.S. nuclear deterrent has worked, as advertised, for there has been no nuclear war between the

²⁵³Bernard Gwertzman, "New Zealander Wants to Avoid Fight With U.S.," New York Times, 16 July 1984, p. 1.

²⁵⁴Geoffrey Murray, "USS Enterprise Visit to Japan: Less Turmoil Than In 1968," Christian Science Monitor, 23 March 1983, p. 14.

²⁵⁵Ibid., p. 14.

U.S. and the Soviet Union. In the absence of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, no one knows exactly what the Soviets would do. The U.S. nuclear umbrella must continue in its present form of direction and control to ensure its effectiveness.

The Soviets have countered the U.S. nuclear umbrella by attempting to intimidate Japan with deployment of their SS-20 missiles. As the Japanese Defense "White Paper" discusses:

The non-strategic nuclear forces, particularly intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), judging from their range, are primarily aimed at countries around the Soviet Union, such as the NATO countries, Japan and China rather than the United States. The Soviet Union seems to be trying to alienate the United States from other free nations within range of Soviet INF by creating doubts about the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrent power through the massive deployment of Soviet INF.²⁵⁶

Japan has promised to abide by "three non-nuclear principles:...not to possess, not to manufacture, and not to introduce nuclear weapons into the country."²⁵⁷ The U.S., therefore, must remain as the only nuclear deterrent force that prevents Soviet nuclear adventurism in this region.

E. THE EFFECTS OF COOPERATION

1. The United States

Cooperation between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF is in the best interest of the U.S. The advantages simply overpower the disadvantages. On the positive side; the U.S. would enjoy greater Far East security with fewer U.S. Navy ship commitments, hence a better deployment cycle for United States Navy Pacific Fleet ships. The ROK Navy and JMSDF

²⁵⁶ Japan Defense Agency, Defense, p. 7.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 60.

would improve their own readiness as they operated together with the U.S. forces on a regular basis. After cooperation became routine, the U.S. could divert some defense funding or units from the Far East on a temporary basis, if it became necessary to use them in another part of the world. Flexibility would increase because more U.S. forces could be available to respond to other threats in the region.

On the other side of the ledger, ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation could bring less U.S. influence in the security of the Far East. As ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation increased, and became more effective, it is conceivable that Japan could demand that the U.S. withdraw its forces from Japan. While security of the Far East could perhaps be delegated to the strengthened ROK Navy - JMSDF team, it is unlikely that Washington would view the demand to leave Japanese bases with pleasure.²⁵⁸ If ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation brought with it a dramatic decrease in U.S. regional security influence, Washington might balk at the idea of cooperation.

Another potential problem is Japan's pacifistic tendencies and what they mean to cooperation. A leading public-opinion poll in 1983, asked the question: "What would you do if Japan was invaded by a foreign power?" In response, 44 percent of those polled said they would run away or surrender, while only 20.6 per cent said they would stay and fight. Of the younger respondents, aged 15-24 years old, 54 percent said they would run or surrender.²⁵⁹

This raises the question about Japanese resolve to defend themselves and/or the Republic of Korea. In time of war, is it conceivable that the Japanese could fail to uphold their part of the ROK - JMSDF security agreement?

²⁵⁸ Takashi Oka, "Admiral: Cooperation," p. 1.

²⁵⁹ Geoffrey Murray, "Pacifism Reigns in Japan As US Pushes It To Rearm," Christian Science Monitor, 23 March 1983, pp. 1 and 14.

Without Japan's full cooperation and promise to defend itself and the ROK, cooperation would be disastrous for all concerned.

How would Asia react? Who would be in favor of cooperation; who against? A ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation agreement would be in the best interest of the U.S. Clearly, it would not be in the best interest of the USSR and the DPRK. How about the rest of Asia? What would be their response?

2. The People's Republic of China (PRC)

The PRC is so preoccupied with economic recovery, internal affairs, and the Soviet military on Chinese borders that ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation may not seriously concern them if cooperation doesn't impact on PRC sovereignty. China could condemn the cooperation for the sake of their friends in the DPRK. However, the PRC is too preoccupied with other things to be overly concerned about naval cooperation between Japan and the ROK.

The PRC does have legitimate security concerns in the Yellow Sea. Its North Sea Fleet is composed of about 500 vessels, including 2 submarine squadrons, and uses the Yellow Sea as its primary operating area.²⁶⁰ The Yellow Sea is also the primary operating area of the DPRK's West Coast Fleet. The fact remains that the Navy is the smallest branch of service for both of these nations.²⁶¹ The PRC Navy has little impact on the Sino-Soviet conflict. As long as the Yellow Sea remains a place where the PRC can operate freely, then ROK - Japan naval cooperation would be of less concern to them than the installation of more Soviet SS-20 missiles.

²⁶⁰International Institute Balance, p. 93.

²⁶¹Ibid., pp. 92 and 103.

The March, 1985, incident involving the PRC hydrofoil attempting defection to the Republic of China is a case in point. The PRC did not make an incident out of this, save sending three small craft to attempt a "rescue" of the stray hydrofoil. The ROK Navy sent these PRC Navy vessels away with a "show of force."²⁶² Later the PRC simply requested the return of its two remaining injured sailors, to which the Republic of Korea agreed.²⁶³ This low-key approach to a generally significant incident demonstrates the PRC is not overly concerned about seaborne issues, as long as those issues are handled with understanding.

Of more significance to the PRC is the impact this ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation would have on the DPRK. Friendly PRC-DPRK relations are more important than ever, since the Soviet alliance with Vietnam.²⁶⁴ A predominant USSR position in the DPRK would disturb a PRC already wary of the inroads the Soviets have made to encircle China. Could a ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation pact so concern the DPRK, that the PRC would oppose it, fearing enactment could send North Korea to the Soviet camp? The answer to this question is probably "no."

The PRC should continue to have several advantages over the Soviets in competing for DPRK influence. First, the historical and cultural affinity between Chinese and Koreans is strong. Second, participation of Chinese soldiers in the Korean War strengthened that bond. Finally, Kim Il Sung fears that the Soviets might try to establish a

²⁶²"6 Chinese Dead on Torpedo Boat off South Korea," A.P. Wire service Report in the Monterey Peninsula Herald, 24 March 1985, p. 1.

²⁶³"South Korea Returns Chinese," A.P. Wire service Report in the Monterey Peninsula Herald, 28 March 1985, p. 2.

²⁶⁴Ralph H. Clough, "Recent Trends in the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," ed. Claude A. Buss, Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 499. (Xeroxed)

DPRK government more to their liking, as in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.²⁶⁵

The PRC could have concern about the way the Soviet Union would react to this ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. As Jonathan Pollack states:

...no matter how grandiose China's united front rhetoric, the Chinese sought to restrain the Soviet exercise of power, not goad Moscow into preemptive action against the PRC. Collaborative actions with the West were intended to complicate Soviet efforts to consolidate their geopolitical gains in both Southeast and Southwest Asia, diminish Soviet pressure against China, and temper or deter further Soviet actions in areas of instability.²⁶⁶

China does not want to anger the Soviets, anymore than anger the U.S. The PRC will probably, therefore, neither strongly condemn ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation, nor affirm or participate in it. The PRC needs time and technology to eventually catch up with the superpowers. They hope to get continued technology support from the West to improve both the military and economic aspects of China. They also hope to keep the Soviets at bay, to buy time for them to reach for super power status.

3. Republic of China (ROC)

The cooperation between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF is a complex issue as viewed from the Republic of China (ROC). It could be evaluated as a positive step to ensure greater security in East Asia; a step that Taiwan could take pride in because it confirms what they have been saying: that Communism is bankrupt. However, neither the Soviet Union, nor the DPRK are Taiwan's major concern. As Tun-Hwa

²⁶⁵Ibid., p. 499.

²⁶⁶Jonathan D. Pollack, "Mainland China's Role in Pacific Basin Security," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," Claude A. Buss, ed. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 429. (Xeroxed)

Ko states: "She (Taiwan) has no enemies outside the China mainland."²⁶⁷

Taiwan might have one more enemy: time. Since the U.S.-PRC rapprochement in 1972,²⁶⁸ the clock has been running down on Taiwan as a separate nation in East Asia. The ROC government is wise enough to understand this, yet has firmly rejected all PRC attempts to negotiate Taiwan's reunification with mainland China.

While the PRC's 1981 nine-point reunification proposal which allows Taiwan to keep its military, economy, and share in government may look good on paper, the ROC leadership remembers what happened to Tibet in 1951. That year Tibet signed an agreement with the PRC to become part of China. The PRC plan, which guaranteed to honor Tibet's religion, governmental system and the Dalai Lama, was abandoned when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) marched into Tibet and killed thousands of Tibetans.²⁶⁹

Taiwan doesn't trust the PRC but will not be able to turn back the clock to pre-normalization days. The notion that the Republic of China will be able to cooperate as a full security partner with Japan and the Republic of Korea forming the "Iron Triangle"²⁷⁰ is not a viable option today. Normalization of U.S.-PRC relations has precipitated ROK-Japan diplomatic movement toward the PRC and away from Taiwan. However, the Republic of China contributes to the

²⁶⁷Tun-Hwa Ko, "The Interests and Policies of the Republic of China," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," ed. Claude A. Buss. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 461. (Xeroxed)

²⁶⁸Yung Wei, "The Republic of China, and the Pacific Basin: Policy Perspectives in the 1980's," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," ed. Claude A. Buss. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 476. (Xeroxed)

²⁶⁹Ko, "China," p. 452.

²⁷⁰A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, The Iron Triangle, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1984.)

stability of the Far East and desires to continue that contribution.

To buy as much time as possible, the ROC has gone into a holding pattern. They would like the U.S. to basically do these things:

1. Keep the "Taiwan Relations Act" intact.
2. Make no further concession to the PRC's demand on Taiwan.
3. Encourage informal, cooperative studies on such matters as lines of communication and naval cooperation in the Pacific Basin.²⁷¹

The U.S. will have difficulty honoring these requests. The third one, however, does seem to compliment ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. Wanting to retain good U.S. relations, Taiwan will probably approve of the cooperation. The cooperation agreement will not solve its problems surrounding ROC-PRC reunification, but it could perpetuate the status quo, and thus, a sovereign ROC.

4. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)

The SRV would probably be concerned about Japan - ROK naval cooperation. Their most immediate consideration could be how the Soviets would react to this cooperation vis-a-vis their naval base at Cam Rahn Bay. It is conceivable that the Soviets could expand the base and/or naval force levels beyond their current commitment of 24 large, long-range reconnaissance or combat aircraft (TU-16 Badger and TU-95 Bear), a squadron of MIG-23 Flogger Fighters and between 25 and 30 ships, including submarines, surface ships, and auxiliary ships.²⁷² If this happened, the SRV would have to evaluate whether more Soviet ships stationed

²⁷¹Ibid., p. 461.

²⁷²Department of Defense, Soviet, p. 131.

on Vietnamese soil would be sympathetic with their national goals, or in opposition to them.

Naval cooperation between Japan and South Korea would be viewed by the SRV as a positive step for Washington and a negative one for Moscow. This fact should disturb the SRV, particularly if they continue to tie their fortunes so totally to the Soviet Union. The SRV is almost completely dependent on the USSR for aid and trade.

The USSR continues to supply Vietnam with all of its defense needs, in effect underwriting its annual defense expenditures--estimated at 50 percent of the total SRV state budget. It also supplies Vietnam with all of its petroleum and most of its chemical fertilizer. Moscow draws from Vietnam as much as it can by way of exports, but there is little Vietnam has to offer. The result is one of the worst trade imbalances of any country in the world.²⁷³

The PRC and the SRV are currently involved in a "cold war" of sorts. The 1979 month-long border war between the two nations was inconclusive, but did tarnish the Chinese military reputation.²⁷⁴ Neither the PRC, nor the SRV, want a repeat of that incident, though troop redeployments from the conflict remain essentially intact.²⁷⁵

The PRC considers it knows how to properly handle the SRV. As Douglas Pike writes:

Chinese leaders believe they know how to deal with Vietnam and how to influence it, the product of centuries of experience. Further, they believe the U.S. and others do not know how to handle Vietnam. The Beijing formula involves sustained unrelieved pressure of any sort that can be mounted. The Vietnamese understand only force, say the Chinese, and anything but force is misread in Hanoi as weakness. A forthcoming gesture or an offer to compromise differences, the Chinese add,

²⁷³ Douglas Pike, "The Security Situation in Indochina," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," ed. Claude A. Buss. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 317. (Xeroxed).

²⁷⁴ Pollack, "China's Role," p. 437.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 436.

merely convinces the Hanoi leaders they were right all along and that they need only to continue their implacableness to eventually get what they want. There does seem to be merit in the Chinese policy approach, based on past history, although it must be noted that three years of the Chinese method, has yielded none of the results the Chinese desire.²⁷⁶

Because a ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation agreement would likely be opposed by the SRV, the PRC might view this as potential leverage against Soviet influence in the SRV. If the Soviets cannot stop this cooperation between U.S. allies which strengthens Western security in the Far East, can they be trusted to continue to fully support the SRV? While the PRC would not embrace ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation predominantly because of the DPRK's revulsion to it, the cooperation could have positive fallout for SRV-PRC relations.

There is no guarantee, however, that Vietnam will continue to remain a close military ally with the Soviet Union. Since World War II, the Vietnamese have had a history of expelling those who would attempt to influence them. First the French, then the United States learned that lesson. Could the Soviets be next? Douglas Pike states it simply, "The Vietnamese don't like to be dependent on the USSR, nor do they particularly like the Russians."²⁷⁷

If, in the years ahead, the Vietnamese gradually moved away from the Soviets politically, it is difficult to visualize them as too concerned about a ROK - Japan naval cooperation agreement. The SRV is already preoccupied with other issues. Their economy is in shambles, they share a strategic border with a currently hostile PRC, they are militarily involved in Kampuchea, and they are nearly friendless in the world, save Cuba and the USSR.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁶Pike, "Indochina," p. 315.

²⁷⁷Ibid., p. 318.

As long as the SRV and the USSR remain close economically and militarily, the SRV will be concerned about ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. If the relationship with the Soviets changes dramatically, so, too, could their opinion of ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation.

5. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), composed of representatives from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei, is not widely recognized for its ability to reach a consensus on political issues. Yet the basic ideologies of the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, is known by ASEAN, and no one particularly cares for communism.²⁷⁹ While the Soviet Union is recognized for its military power, it presents no attraction to these ASEAN nations as an economic or social model. The U.S., on the other hand, does.

A ROK Navy - JMSDF agreement of cooperation that would provide for greater Asian security and please the U.S., would also, generally speaking, please ASEAN. The trouble with ASEAN, is that it's virtually impossible to speak "generally" about any issue concerning it. While there might be overall approval, individual nations will have their own opinions.

Curiously, one of the United States' closest associates in ASEAN could be the most adamantly opposed to a ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. The Philippines still harbors deep-seated hatred for Japan, stemming from Japanese treatment of the Filipinos in World War II. The thought of a remilitarized Japan disgusts them. No Philippine

²⁷⁸Ibid., pp. 328-329.

²⁷⁹Claude A. Buss, ed. Introductory comments in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin." Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 301. (Xeroxed)

government, Marcos or otherwise, would welcome this cooperation unless there was direct, and significant economic benefit for the Philippines in it.

Recognizing this problem, Prime Minister Nakasone made a tour of five Southeast Asian nations: Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in May, 1983, in an effort to allay fears of Japan's increased military expenditures.²⁸⁰ A masterful diplomat, Nakasone convinced even President Marcos of the Philippines that Japan is merely improving its defensive, not offensive capabilities. Marcos told reporters following the meeting, "I am convinced he (Nakasone) has no intent of building up a strong military (for) Japan with capability for attack."²⁸¹ This incident demonstrates the persuasive powers of Prime Minister Nakasone, but it does not clear the way for Philippine approval of ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation.

Indonesia, too, has unpleasant memories of Japanese wartime occupation and would likely be concerned about ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. During a 1983 visit to Washington, President Suharto expressed his concern that the U.S. was pushing Japan too hard to become a military power. However, Prime Minister Nakasone worked his magic with President Suharto during the Japanese leader's ASEAN trip. Following talks with Nakasone, Suharto said he had no objections to Japan's current military build-up, "If it is purely in self-defense."²⁸² Jakarta might accept a ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation plan if it could be sold as "purely self-defense."

²⁸⁰Geoffrey Murray, "Japan's Nakasone Mends Fences With Southeast Asia," Christian Science Monitor, 11 May 1983, p. 13.

²⁸¹Ibid., p. 13.

²⁸²Ibid., p. 13.

Jakarta might also demand more justification for such cooperation. As the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia is not attracted by godless communism.²⁸³ However, Indonesia is a leading advocate for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), as a method of minimizing the possibility of superpower confrontation. Consequently, Indonesia could be wary of any cooperation based upon military strength to deter the Soviets.

From Indonesia's standpoint, this proposed cooperation between the navies of the Republic of Korea and Japan misses the mark for a different reason. Indonesia views not the USSR as the primary threat, but rather the PRC as its long-term concern.²⁸⁴ Unless this cooperation would address the PRC threat, which it would not, whole-hearted Indonesian support might be difficult to earn.

Prime Ministers Lee Kuan Yew and Datuk Seri Mahathir Mohammad, of Singapore and Malaysia, respectively, would probably be strong supporters of the program. Both these countries are deeply rooted in British tradition,²⁸⁵ and appreciate a strong counter-balance to the Soviet threat. Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, whose Malaysian "Look East policy is...a personal crusade...to launch the nation from its embryonic industrialization phase,"²⁸⁶ is receptive to Asians ensuring Asian security. To back this up, he has increased Malaysian defense expenditures by almost 200

²⁸³ Lie Tek Tjeng, "The Asia-Pacific Power Balance As Seen From Jakarta: A Projection For the Eighties and Beyond," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," ed. Claude A. Buss. Hoover Institution, Stanford California, 1984, p. 335. (Xeroxed)

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 338.

²⁸⁵ Claude A. Buss, Asia in the Modern World. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1964), p. 721.

²⁸⁶ Chandran Jeshurun, "The Interests and Policies of Malaysia: A Study in Historical Change," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," ed. Claude A. Buss. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 349. (Xeroxed)

percent between 1979 and 1982.²⁸⁷ A ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation agreement that assumed more regional security responsibilities would be welcome.

Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew would probably also embrace ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. He insists that a united ASEAN front against the Soviet Union and its Vietnamese satellite is essential to security in Southeast, and has even proposed joint ASEAN military exercises.²⁸⁸ He is pro free trade and would likely embrace this cooperation that supports freedom of the sea-lanes of communication (SLOC) as a high priority.

Thailand is the country most threatened by Vietnam's adventurism in Kampuchea. The Thais, however, are savvy at the game of international relations and usually support the side that has the most power.²⁸⁹ As Sukhumband Paribatra says of his countrymen: "When the chips are down, the Thais love to be standing next to the one with the biggest pile of chips."²⁹⁰ The Thais have no delusions about U.S. resolve, particularly in light of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. But pragmatism dictates the Soviets/SRV have nothing to offer Thailand, while the U.S. still enjoys a booming economy and an open market for their goods.²⁹¹ A cooperation agreement between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF would probably not concern Thailand as long as the U.S. keeps the "biggest pile of chips."

²⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 356.

²⁸⁸ Paul Quinn-Judge, "View from Bangkok: Defense and Economy Are Shared Concerns," Christian Science Monitor, 4 March 1983, pp. 12-13.

²⁸⁹ Jeshurun, "Malaysia," p. 359.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 362.

²⁹¹ Ibid., p. 361.

The newest ASEAN member is the tiny oil rich Kingdom of Brunei. Located on the northern coast of Malaysia, Brunei contributes only 233,000 people²⁹² to a total population of 277 million²⁹³ in ASEAN member nations. Brunei can be likened more to a Persian Gulf state than a Southeast Asian country. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah is a pragmatic leader, who respects the west and is supportive of U.S. regional defense plans.²⁹⁴ He would likely approve of ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation, if the United States encouraged it.

6. Australia, New Zealand, U.S. (ANZUS)

When ANZUS was established in 1951, this idea of Republic of Korea - Japan cooperation would have never sold. The ANZUS Treaty was a U.S. quid pro quo payment to Australia and New Zealand in return for their agreement to sign the Japanese peace treaty at the conclusion of World War II.²⁹⁵

Twenty years after World War II, Japan and Australia have become economically interdependent to a remarkable degree. Japan is Australia's largest customer, especially for raw materials and Australia is an important market for Japanese manufactured goods.²⁹⁶ Australia-ROK trading volume can be expected to increase as the ROK economy continues to expand.²⁹⁷

²⁹²Rodney Tasker, "Our Functioning Power Is Only Five-and-a-Half," Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 March 1984, p. 57.

²⁹³International Institute, Balance, pp. 96-102.

²⁹⁴Tasker, "Functioning Power," p. 57.

²⁹⁵J. D. B. Miller, Australia (New York: Walker and Co., 1966), p. 155.

²⁹⁶T. B. Millar, "Australia and the Security of the Pacific Basin," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," Claude A. Buss, ed. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 248. (Xeroxed)

New Zealand has some of the foodstuffs that Japan requires and the basis for technical knowledge that both Japan and the ROK could share in.²⁹⁸ Both Australia and New Zealand have vested interests that mitigate in favor of a ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. In today's world, both countries recognize the need for others to contribute to the security of the region. While not as vocal as the United States on this issue, Australia has joined in urging Japan to spend more on defense, including developing a capacity to patrol sea-lanes.²⁹⁹

New Zealand has fallen on uncomfortable times. With the ruling Labor government's virtual denial of permission for U.S. Navy ships to visit her ports, New Zealand has disappointed the U.S. government and brought world attention to the anti-nuclear weapon issue.³⁰⁰ New Zealand's anti-nuclear weapons position is not a demand for less security, but rather a demand for security without nuclear weapons. New Zealand desires to maintain the ANZUS treaty, and retain its defensive forces. The problem is New Zealand naively believes that nuclear weapons can be isolated from its defense picture. Though maddening to the U.S., it would have no bearing on New Zealand's decision regarding ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. Neither the ROK Navy, nor the JMSDF possess or transport nuclear weapons.

²⁹⁷Koo Youngnok, "The National Interests and Policies of the Republic of Korea," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," Claude A. Buss, ed. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 138. (Xeroxed)

²⁹⁸Henry Albinski, "Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. Security Interests," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," Claude A. Buss, ed. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, pp. 210-211. (Xeroxed)

²⁹⁹Ibid., p. 156.

³⁰⁰Bernard Gwertzman, "New Zealander Wants to Avoid Fight With U.S.," New York Times, 16 July 1984, p. 1.

Australia and New Zealand should, therefore, welcome ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation as an effort to strengthen the security of the Far East. For them it is an ideal situation because they enjoy the benefits, but do not have to pay a penny for the privilege.

7. South Korea

Due to its unique situation with an unpredictable, powerful, enemy in the DPRK, the ROK considers national security as their number one priority. Koo Youngnok, distinguished professor and writer, evaluates the ROK's top six priorities in descending order of importance, as follows: "national security, economic development, political development, national unification, regional interests, global interests."³⁰¹ It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that the ROK would be in favor of prudent measures to enhance its national security. ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation is such a measure.

There are several benefits that the ROK could reap from naval cooperation with Japan. One is the greater world recognition and esteem this cooperation would bring to the ROK. Seoul is conscious of its world image,³⁰² and encourages any endeavor that dissuades those from thinking that the television program, "M*A*S*H," and the Reverend Moon are an accurate depiction of the Republic of Korea.

A ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation arrangement would tend to dispel the mistaken belief that the ROK is merely a U.S. puppet. ROK association with a generally anti-militaristic, post World War II Japan could modify Seoul's police state image, which was regrettably enhanced by the

³⁰¹Koo Youngnok, "National Interests," p. 134.

³⁰²Jacqueline Reditt, "South Korea: President Chun's 3-Year-Old Rule Settles in to a Limited Democracy," Christian Science Monitor, 28 April 1983, p. 12.

events surrounding the return to South Korea of dissident Kim Dae Jung.³⁰³ With the advent of the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, the Republic of Korea would welcome any prudent measure to demonstrate their legitimacy, magnanimity, and leadership in the Far East to the world.

The Republic of Korea would also be helping its closest and most necessary ally, the United States. By cooperating with the JMSDF, the ROK Navy could encourage the Japanese to assume more of a vital role in their own defense and hence the security of the Far East.³⁰⁴ Washington would appreciate this gesture; perhaps even to the point of offering the Republic of Korea a subsidy or economic aid.

Finally, as already mentioned, this cooperation would bring with it increased security against DPRK or Soviet aggression without significantly increased defense expenditures in the Republic of Korea. Even with all these positive aspects of cooperation, the Republic of Korea would still have some reservations.

The ROK is dependent on the United States to ensure its ultimate security. There is a suspicion in Seoul that the U.S. is looking for a way to pull its troops out of South Korea. This suspicion is not entirely unfounded. The Nixon Doctrine and the subsequent 1970 reduction of U.S. forces by one Army division, the crisis of confidence that centered around the United States defeat in Vietnam, and the 1977 Carter plan for a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops,³⁰⁵ all point to a perceived U.S. desire to leave South Korea as soon as possible. If the ROK believed that its cooperation with Japan would offer the U.S. an excuse to again propose

³⁰³ Mark Whitaker, "A Test of Wills in South Korea," Newsweek, 18 February 1985, pp. 36-37.

³⁰⁴ Edward A. Olsen, "Why Not Let South Korea Help?" Christian Science Monitor, 2 June 1983, p. 23.

³⁰⁵ Koo, "Republic of Korea," p. 136.

the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, that cooperation would probably not happen.

Academician Han Sung-Joo raised concern over United States encouragement for Japan's spending more on its defense:

But the most serious security threat to other Asian countries resulting from an accelerated Japanese military buildup will arise from the possibility that, either out of confidence in Japanese military capability or friction with rearmed Japan, the United States may choose to reduce or end its military presence in the area.³⁰⁶

If naval cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Japan is perceived as a Japanese military buildup, then South Korea would probably not agree to cooperate.

These concerns are real and won't evaporate. The U.S. will have to ensure that the Republic of Korea believes this cooperation will not be an excuse for a U.S. troop withdrawal from the ROK, and convince them that Japan is not rearming to dominate East Asia. If this can be done, the the ROK has substantial justification to endorse this ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation plan.

8. Japan

Japan is the key to the success or failure of this proposed naval cooperation. It is at the center of several difficult issues that directly impact upon the potential for cooperation between the ROK, JMSDF, and the U.S. Navy. One of the most critical between the U.S. and Japan, and therefore the entire cooperation issue, is the question of burden sharing. The problem with the MSDF is quite simple. It is too small to do its job, so the United States does it for

³⁰⁶ Han Sung-Joo, "The Republic of Korea and the Major Powers," in "National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin," ed. Claude A. Buss. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 170. (Xeroxed)

Japan. It simply does not have enough ships and men to protect its coastline, let alone patrol 1000 nautical miles from it, as Prime Ministers Suzuki and Nakasone agreed to support.³⁰⁷ Clearly, the Japanese need to allocate more money to the proper areas of defense. With the second largest GNP in the world, a population of over 120,800,000,³⁰⁸ and a country virtually dependent upon overseas trade, a Navy of 54 major combatants³⁰⁹ is a less than serious attempt at self-defense.

How can the United States encourage the Japanese to do more? Does the U.S. have to renegotiate a new U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, before Japan will consent to invest more in its defense? While the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty has heretofore been an excuse for Japan to spend little on defense,³¹⁰ I do not believe it is in the best interest of the United States or future ROK - Japan naval cooperation to abrogate that treaty in the hope of renegotiating a better one.

This issue has been unsuccessfully addressed by two 1981 U.S. Congressional proposals. The first, by Senator Jesse Helms (R., N.C.), proposed an amendment to renegotiate the U.S.-Japan security treaty making it a reciprocal arrangement. A second, by Stephen Neal (D., N.C.), proposed Japan pay a two percent "security tax" to the U.S. to share in the Far East security burden. The U.S. Senate tabled Senator Helms' proposal. Congressman Neal's was denounced by a Japanese editorial in Asahi Evening News, which claimed

³⁰⁷Bouchard and Hess, "Sea Lanes Defense," p. 90.

³⁰⁸International Institute, Military Balance, p. 92.

³⁰⁹Ibid., p. 101.

³¹⁰Geoffrey Murray, "Rearming Japan: Nakasone's Policies Renew Old Debate," Christian Science Monitor, 4 April 1983, p. 12.

that the Congressman didn't understand the Japan-U.S. security treaty at all.³¹¹

If the U.S. gave notice to cancel the Treaty to renegotiate a new treaty, three things could happen, and two of them would be bad. Japan could fail to negotiate a new treaty; could negotiate a poorer treaty; or could negotiate a better treaty. In other words, the chance that a better treaty would emerge is one out of three. For example, treaty abrogation could tempt Japan to go a Gaullist independent, a pacifistic, or a militaristic route. They might believe that the United States would protect them even without any Treaty, which is probably true, and therefore see no reason to negotiate a new one.

A further problem is the fluctuating U.S. domestic political climate and the difficulty of sticking tough to an issue that could take several years to resolve. Americans want fast, victorious wars; fast negotiations; fast foods and fast solutions to vast problems. A patient Japanese approach to developing a mutual defense treaty could result in a poorer treaty arrangement for an impatient United States. If our impatience prevented the U.S. from getting the kind of treaty we need, then we deserve what we get.

These potential pitfalls of major treaty renegotiation merely point out that while the benefits could indeed be significant, the chance of failure is manifold. Our current inadequate treaty is better than a poor one, which is better than no treaty at all.

From Japan's perspective, the U.S. has been browbeating them since the late 1960's, trying to get them to spend more money on defense. The Japanese know they've got a good deal in the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, yet

³¹¹Edward A. Olsen, US-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1985), p. 27.

they have contributed something to the military security omelet. In their minds, they haven't gotten a "free ride," yet the U.S. never thanks them for their contribution, but instead, always demands more.³¹²

A partial solution to these troubling issues would be the cooperation of JMSDF and ROK navies. This cooperation would please the U.S., cost no party a great deal more money, probably less for the U.S., and perhaps quiet strong U.S. criticism of Japan's low defense spending.

A second issue is the question of modifying the Japanese Constitution in order to permit ROK - Japan - U.S. naval cooperation. Modifying the Constitution is a Pandora's Box that Japanese officials have heretofore avoided like the plague. However, they have still managed to do exactly what they have wanted to with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, while the Constitution was firmly in place.

If Japan decides that the ROK Navy and JMSDF cooperation is appropriate, the Constitution can be amended. However, that will probably not be necessary. For example, the Japanese already participate in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises with Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States, and have done so since 1980.³¹³ If this participation in an exercise that spans the entire Pacific Ocean can be accepted as a legitimate self-defense effort within the context of the Constitution, then a ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation effort should be constitutionally acceptable.

A third problem area that should be carefully worked out is the question of Japanese public opinion. This is crucial to the success of any attempt at naval cooperation.

³¹² Ibid., p. 13.

³¹³ Japan Defense Agency, Defense, p. 179.

Without it, this proposal has no chance. This issue is particularly acute in Japan where the memories of World War II are of hunger, death and dishonor.³¹⁴

The anti-war attitude is strong in Japan and supports a national bent toward pacifism. Only 20.6 per cent of those Japanese polled in a 1983 survey said they would defend Japan if it was invaded by a foreign power.³¹⁵ Getting this Japanese public to agree to cooperation with the Republic of Korea on defense issues could be quite a challenge.

How, then, can Japanese public opinion change enough to permit cooperation? To begin, if any one person can effectively alter public opinion in this issue, Prime Minister Nakasone can. Unlike most of his predecessors, Nakasone is a dynamic leader with a great faculty for communication. Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew agreed when he complimented Nakasone on being so different from previous Japanese P. M.'s who used, "soft and misty language."³¹⁶ Nakasone's communicating skill was again demonstrated when he convincingly appeared on Japanese television with an unprecedented plea to "buy more foreign goods."³¹⁷ If Prime Minister Nakasone fully supported and backed this cooperation proposal, public opinion could gradually change. While Nakasone can not retain his current

³¹⁴Clyde Haberman, "Japanese Celebrate, Sort of, a Patriotic Day Today," New York Times, 11 February 1984, p. 2.

³¹⁵Geoffrey Murray, "Pacifism Reigns in Japan as US Pushes It to Rearm," Christian Science Monitor, 23 March 1983, p.1.

³¹⁶Geoffrey Murray, "Japan's Nakasone Mends Fences With Southeast Asia," Christian Science Monitor, 11 May 1983, p. 13.

³¹⁷Charles P. Alexander, "Buy More Foreign Goods," Time Magazine, 22 April 1985, pp. 42-43.

position for a third term, he almost certainly will remain very influential for many years in an "elder statesman" role.

Another factor is an apparent easing of anti-war sentiment in Japan. Two examples illustrate this point. First, is the success Japan has enjoyed with the RIMPAC exercises.³¹⁸ As few as ten years ago, Japanese public opinion would have prevented JMSDF participation in this joint U.S., Canada, New Zealand, Australia exercise. Today, JMSDF participation is generally accepted by the Japanese public.³¹⁹

A second example is the lack of political protest connected with the March, 1983, Japanese port visit of the U.S. Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise. The last port visit of the Enterprise to Japan, in 1968, was punctuated with violent demonstrations, which resulted in the injury of 600 people.³²⁰ This latest visit was peaceful in comparison, with a few thousand demonstrators, some small boats in the harbor, and no reported injuries.³²¹ With time, the Japanese people can moderate even deeply-held beliefs, such as is the anti-nuclear position.

Japanese public opinion might be encouraged to move in a direction favorable to ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. However, this will not happen overnight. With the proper encouragement from government officials over time, the Japanese could eventually support this cooperation as a necessary step to ensure Japan's defense. This will not be easy, but it is possible.

³¹⁸ Japan Defense Agency, Defense, p. 179.

³¹⁹ Frank Cranston, "Japanese To Play Bigger RIMPAC Role," Jane's Defense Weekly, 18 February 1984, p. 226.

³²⁰ Geoffrey Murray, "USS Enterprise Visit to Japan: Less Turmoil Than in 1968," Christian Science Monitor, 23 March 1983, p. 14.

³²¹ Ibid., p. 14.

XII. CONCLUSION

Japan knows the Soviet military presence in the Pacific is real. While they consider the threat to their security to be economic, they are not blind to Soviet military power. The Japanese also know that the Soviets aspire to somehow gain control of, or neutralize, their island nation if for no other reason than to tilt the East-West balance in the Pacific in their favor.³²²

Since World War II, Japan has enjoyed the protection of the United States at minimal cost. Pacifism has developed and flourished as a viable national response to foreign threat.³²³ The shooting down of South Korea's Flight 007, in which 28 innocent Japanese people were killed,³²⁴ makes it more difficult to justify pacifism as a response to the Soviet Union. While they do not acknowledge a true Soviet "threat," the Japanese concede the "threat potential" of the USSR. That is enough.

To partially counter that potential threat, and to placate U.S., the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has increased in size slightly, but increased its capability and sophistication significantly. Today's MSDF is a professional group, whose shipboard cleanliness and smart military appearance during exercises have impressed observers.³²⁵ They seem somehow to be positively motivated to do a job on which many in Japan frown.

³²² Geoffrey Murray, "Tokyo Worries Soviet SS-20's May Swing West," Christian Science Monitor, 21 January 1983, p. 1.

³²³ Geoffrey Murray, "Pacifism Reigns" p. 1.

³²⁴ Japan Defense Agency, Defense, p. 111.

³²⁵ Bouchard and Hess, "Sea Lanes Defense," p. 94.

The problem is Japan's inability to recognize that it is no longer the "poor little island country" it once was. With the world's second largest GNP, next to the mighty U.S.,³²⁶ Japan is far from poor. Japan must see that it has legitimate defense responsibilities in the region, that they are not currently supporting. Only if they feel obligated will they help. If they are merely encouraged to spend more money, they will grudgingly spend a bit more.

The Republic of Korea, on the other hand, clearly sees the DPRK as the major threat.³²⁷ The DPRK enjoys superior numbers of Naval platforms. However, unlike the North Korean Air Force, where larger numbers of older aircraft meant little when faced with more effective ROK Air Force aircraft, the sheer number of North Korean vessels must be viewed with concern by the South. The North has little or no long-range naval power projection capability, yet it has an effective coastal surveillance and defense Navy.³²⁸ While the ROK Navy has larger ships, and a more sophisticated surface-to-surface antishipping missile in the Harpoon, the North has many more missiles, torpedoes and guns to neutralize the South's qualitative advantage.³²⁹ The South is the more professional of the two in antisubmarine warfare and antiair warfare, yet neither North nor South could match the U.S., USSR, or the UK in these important areas.³³⁰

Most scenarios of a Northern invasion of South Korea find the Navy playing only a limited role, including anti-shiping operations, special forces insertion, naval gunfire support, and protection of the homeland. Within these

³²⁶International Institute, Balance, p. 101.

³²⁷Koo, "Republic of Korea," p. 134.

³²⁸International Institute, Balance, p. 103.

³²⁹Ibid., p. 103.

³³⁰Moore, Jane's Ships 1984-85, pp. 304-307.

partial Northern goals, there is ample evidence that the North's superior numbers could overcome the South's qualitative advantage and thus achieve its goals.

It seems, then, that a panacea for both the Republic of Korea and Japan could be naval cooperation. With the sophistication level of the two naval forces today, their positive motivation, and their professionalism, the JMSDF and the ROK Navy could become a major element in our Pacific defense policy by the year 2000. That will happen, however, only if these countries can overcome their historical animosity and join with the U.S. Navy in a cooperative pact.

It is conceivable that South Korea's efforts to improve overall Asian security in the face of the Soviet threat could engender stronger U.S.-ROK defense ties. As discussed in Chapter VII, the ROK fears the U.S. is looking for an excuse to pull American troops out of South Korea. If by cooperating with the JMSDF, the ROK Navy assumed more of the overall Far East security burden, America would have difficulty defending a pull out of U.S. troops. South Korea's support at sea could be reciprocated with continued U.S. support on the Korean peninsula, thus both would benefit.

Additionally, the U.S. could use ROK Navy participation in Far East security as an incentive to encourage Japan to contribute more. Edward Olsen explores this potential when he says:

...it is unlikely that Japan could tolerate passively the humiliation of another Asian country doing Japan's duty--particularly if it is South Korea. Having Americans do Japan's job may seem wise and crafty to Tokyo, but being shown up by Koreans would be galling to the Japanese sense of pride and honor. The peer pressure resulting from such a loss of face, probably exacerbated by Koreans' willingness to play their role to the hilt, could well stir Japan to meet its responsibilities to help the US bear the burden for regional security....³³¹

³³¹ Edward A. Olsen, "Why Not Let South Korea Help?" Christian Science Monitor, 2 June 1983, p. 23.

The worst that could happen is that Japan could ignore the subtleties of the situation and not contribute more to the security equation. This would leave the U.S. no worse off than today. However, Japan might be encouraged to do more, a situation favorable to the United States.

The U.S. must take the lead in this endeavor, and therein lies the challenge. It will be difficult to establish ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation, but not impossible. There are some advantages that should help. First, both the Republic of Korea and Japan would benefit from it. Japan would gain an ally, the security of more ships, and would placate the United States, partially diffusing the demand for more Japanese military spending. The ROK would gain prestige, validity, and bring more power to bear against its true enemy, the DPRK.

Second, while gaining added security, this cooperation plan is not costly. The emphasis and strength of this plan should be "come as you are" cooperation. Perhaps a slogan, "Come as you are, return with lots more," would be appropriate to help sell the cooperation idea. Everyone appreciates a "bargain," and ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation is an excellent one.

Another benefit of cooperation, is continued improvement in ROK - Japan relations. Much has been accomplished in the last decade to improve relations, including exchange visits by heads of state,³³² resolution of the ROK financial "aid" issue,³³³ and a satisfactory conclusion to the Japanese school books issue.³³⁴ Perhaps the Japanese Emperor's

³³²Clyde Haberman, "Hirohito Soothes Korean President," New York Times, 7 September 1984, p. 1.

³³³"Japan Government Plans to Grant Aid to South Koreans," Wall Street Journal, 13 January 1983, p. 34.

³³⁴Geoffrey Murray, "Japan's Junior High Schoolers Learn (Again) of Their Nation's Militarism," Christian Science Monitor, 7 June 1983, p. 9.

comments to visiting President Chun Doo Hwan are even more significant.³³⁵ Friendship and cooperation on any level between the ROK and Japan is important to both countries. A cooperation agreement between Navies would be particularly beneficial and the easiest of all forms of military cooperation.

The navy is the best branch of service to institute military cooperation between the two countries. The navy is best because it is less visible than the army, air force or marines. Ships operating at sea, miles from view, are easier to accept than a Japanese infantry division exercising in South Korea, or a squadron of ROK F-5 fighter-bombers flying out of Japanese bases. If joint port calls are arranged, they can be orchestrated for two to three days to promote goodwill and brotherhood. A short three-day port visit is infinitely easier to control than a two week in-country exercise.

Finally, naval cooperation is best because cooperation actually ensures greater security, dispelling cooperation-for-cooperation's-sake criticism. Through joint U.S. - ROK - Japan exercises, readiness and training of all could be improved. Any increase in readiness improves security. The ROK and Japan would be better prepared to face foreign military adventurism if it challenged their respective nations.

Why, then, will ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation be difficult? There are a myriad of reasons why this cooperation could never be attained. The current trend toward ROK - Japan reconciliation could shift dramatically from an unforeseen controversy or crisis, fishing dispute, trade war, or change in leadership in Seoul and Tokyo. Barring these events which may or may not occur, there are still many current issues that could prevent cooperation.

³³⁵ "Emperor's Remarks to Chun on Korea Ties," New York Times, 7 September 1984, p. A9.

One such issue is Japan's desire to open trade and cultural exchange with the DPRK. Tokyo has made, and continues, overtures to Pyongyang to avoid the complete isolation of North Korea from the rest of the non-communist world.³³⁶ Although South Korea deprecates these attempts at diplomacy, there is some understanding in Seoul about what Japan is attempting to do. ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation would be violently denounced by Pyongyang and could likely destroy Japanese efforts to maintain a dialogue with it.

This is perhaps the problem that might ultimately prevent ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation. Seoul and Pyongyang so despise each other that any move to improve security is viewed by the other as an act of aggression. A possible solution is to exempt the Japanese from participation in the ROK Navy's anti-DPRK infiltration work, restricting ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation to the "high seas" only, and designate the DPRK seaborne infiltration problem as either a coastal or Coast Guard-type issue. While this would limit the scope of ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation, it might be the only way for the Japanese to embrace the idea..

Another problem is allocation of military units in time of conflict. Put another way, who protects whom in time of war? This problem was experienced in World War II between the European and Pacific theatres and is certainly not exclusively an issue with ROK - JMSDF cooperation.³³⁷ It remains a difficult issue to resolve and must be handled on a case-by-case basis. A method of resolving this issue would be to let the overall warfare Commander, in this case Commander U.S. Seventh Fleet, make the warfare commander's

³³⁶Geoffrey Murray, "Japan Tiptoes Cautiously Toward Better Relations With North Korea," Christian Science Monitor, 29 July 1983, p. 8

³³⁷E. B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 659.

final decision on where units would be assigned. This would alleviate the possibility of ROK - Japan confrontation over the issue and would assign the U.S. a position of great responsibility.

The United States stands to gain significantly from ROK Navy - JMSDF cooperation for the security of East Asia. The U.S. would directly benefit by reducing its support in defense of the Sea of Japan. This would free some U.S. Naval assets for other uses, and give it better ship deployment cycles. The exercises between ROK - U.S. - Japan navies would raise the readiness level of all and prepare those navies for an effective, quick response in crises. Port visits, exchange officer programs, schooling opportunities and operational conferences would draw the three services closer together in a bond of mutual security. Civil relationships could also improve along the way.

Cooperation between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF is possible, likely and desirable. Since, on balance, all of the countries involved would benefit from this cooperation, the U.S. should strongly encourage it. Early low-key officer exchange programs, conferences, and war games could be the start. Small three-ship exercises could be scheduled with more complicated, sophisticated ones to follow. Carefully orchestrated, the ROK Navy and JMSDF could ease into cooperation without fanfare.

In the absence of cooperation, the United States will continue spending huge sums on the defense of the Far East. That defense will be excellent but will include only piecemeal support from Japan and South Korea. With cooperation, the United States will also spend huge sums of money on the defense of the Far East, but will have two partners to share that responsibility. The former is a responsibility to bear, the latter a partnership to cherish.

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF FORCES OF THE U.S. (FAR EAST)

Naval Forces

Personnel: Navy - 180,000 (Includes Naval Aviation and
Marine - 79,000 (Shore Support)
(Two Divisions)

Submarines: SSBN - 2
SSN - 38
SS - 2

Major Combatants: BB - 1
CVN - 6
CG - 11
CGN - 6
DDG - 15
DD - 16
FFG - 16
FF - 28

Amphibious: 32

Logistic Support: 40

ASW Patrol Aircraft: 250

Air Forces

Personnel (USAF): 45,000

Aircraft: Fighter/Attack (USAF) - 279
(USN/USMC) - 711
Bombers (SAC-TAC) - 12
ASW Patrol - 250

Ground Forces

Personnel: Army - 47,000
Marine - 79,000

Divisions: 2

APPENDIX B
SUMMARY OF FORCES OF NORTH KOREA

Naval Forces

Personnel: 30,500 (plus 40,000 Reserves)
Submarines: SS - 21
Principal Surface Combatants: Corvettes - 4
Patrol Combatants: PTG - 24
Coastal Patrol-River/Roadstand Craft
(Includes Missile and Torpedo Attack Boats): 400

Air Forces

Personnel: 51,000
Aircraft: Bombers - 70 (light)
Ground Attack Fighters - 390
Fighters - 260

Ground Forces:

Personnel: 700,000 (plus 230,000 Reserves)
Forces: Armored Divisions - 2
Motorized Infantry Divisions - 3
Infantry Divisions - 34
Armored Brigades - 5
Infantry Brigades - 9
Equipment: Tanks: - 2,825
Artillery - 3,300 (76mm and above)
Special Forces: 100,000

Paramilitary Forces

Militia and Security Forces: 4,000,000

APPENDIX C

SUMMARY OF FORCES OF THE USSR (FAR EAST)

Naval Forces

Personnel: 134,000 (Includes Naval Aviation, Coastal
Defense, Naval Information, and
Shore Support)

Submarines: SSBN - 31
Others - 102

Principal Surface Combatants: CVHG - 2
CG - 10
CL - 3
DDG - 10
DD - 10
FFG - 10
FF - 10
FFL - 33

Minor Combatants: 220

Naval Aviation: Strike/Bomber/Fighter/Fighter-Bomber
(Includes 30 Backfires) - 120
Tactical Support - 80
Anti-Submarine Warfare - 145
Utility - 65

Air Force

Personnel: 150,000

Aircraft: Bomber/Strike (Includes 40 Backfires) - 200
Ground Attack - 1,200
Fighters - 500

Ground Forces

Personnel: 450,000

Forces: Motorized Rifle/Armored Divisions - 52

Equipment: Tanks: - 13,000
Artillery - 6,500 (122mm and greater)

Strategic Forces: SS-20 - 135

APPENDIX D
SUMMARY OF FORCES OF SOUTH KOREA

Naval Forces

Personnel: 49,000 (includes 20,000 Marines; plus
60,000 Reserves)

Principal Surface Combatants: DD - 11
FF - 8
Corvette - 3

Coastal Patrol Craft: 18

Landing Ships: 33

ASW Aircraft: Fixed Wing - 32
Helicopter - 12

Air Forces

Personnel: 33,000 (plus 55,000 Reserves)

Aircraft: Ground Attack Fighters - 354
Fighters - 72

Ground Forces

Personnel: 540,000 (plus 1,400,000 Regular Army Reserves)

Forces: Mechanized Infantry Divisions - 2
Infantry Divisions - 20
Independent Brigades - 11

Equipment: Tanks - 1,200
Artillery - 2,500 (105mm and above)

Paramilitary Forces

Civilian Defense Corps: 4,400,000

Student Homeland Defense Corps: 1,820,000

APPENDIX E
SUMMARY OF FORCES OF JAPAN

Naval Forces

Personnel: 44,000 (includes 11,000 Naval Air;
plus 600 Reserves)

Submarines: SS - 14

Principal Surface Combatants: DDH - 2
DDG - 11
DD - 9
FFG - 3
FF - 15

Patrol Combatants: PGF - 18

Naval Aircraft: Combat Aircraft (MPA) - 81
Combat Helicopters - 63

Air Forces

Personnel: 46,000

Aircraft: Ground Attack Fighters - 50
Fighters - 200

Ground Forces

Personnel: 155,000 (plus 41,000 Reserves)

Forces: Armored Division - 1
Infantry Divisions - 12 (7,000 or 9,000 men each)
Composite Brigades - 2
Airborne Brigade - 1
Artillery Brigade - 1

Equipment: Tanks - 900
Artillery - 440 (150mm and above)

Paramilitary Forces:

Coast Guard: Large Patrol Ships - 42
Small/Medium Coastal Patrol Craft - 286

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